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The Impact of the European Song Contest on European Identity

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Abstract: The UK’s Brexit vote marked a major institutional crisis for the EU and re-opened the debate, both in the scholarly literature and the media, about the importance and the drivers of a “European identity” for the EU’s citizens. We use quasi-experimental data to estimate the impact of the biggest pan-European cultural event, the Eurovision Song Contest, on whether people in Europe consider themselves to be Europeans. Using data from several years of Eurobarometer surveys with tens of thousands of observations, we find little evidence that the contest provides a sizeable boost to the share of Europeans who feel European, feel EU citizens, or have a positive image of the EU.

Keywords: European Identity; Eurovision; Quasi-Experiment

JEL Classifications: N44; P16; Z1

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I. Introduction

While identity has been a “standard” subject of study in both psychology and sociology, now there is also a substantial literature on identity in economics, focusing mainly on the impact of identity on economic outcomes. One of the first papers to introduce identity into the economics literature is Akerlof and Kranton (2000), who argue that identity, “a person’s sense of self”, is associated with “prescribed behaviours” and that violating such prescribed behaviours leads to discomfort. Consequently, identity affects the payoffs from one’s actions and thus one’s economic behaviour.

Various aspects of the interaction between economic behaviour and identity have since been studied: Benjamin et al. (2010) focus on how identity affects time and risk preferences and Hoff and Pandey (2014) investigate how cues to identity affect intellectual performance, while Kranton et al. (2016) analyse how prosocial behaviour varies with group affiliation.

Besides papers that investigate how identity affects economic outcomes, there is also abundant literature exploring the formation of identity. Olivier et al. (2008) model the interaction between economic globalization and cultural identity, while Costa-i-Font and Cowell (2015) show that joining the eurozone is followed by an increase in European identity, which in turn increases the preference for redistribution.

In this paper, we investigate whether the Eurovision Song Contest (ESC), the most popular European-wide music festival, has a measurable impact on European identity, Europeans’ sense that they belong to Europe. The development of such a European identity is regarded by many observers as crucial for the future of the European Union. Alesina et al. (2017), for example, write: “…the important issue for the future of European integration is not so much that Europeans are still too different from each other in terms of culture, policy preferences, or national interests. The important question is the evolution of national versus European identities.”

For our analysis, we use data from several waves of Eurobarometer with several tens of thousands of observations and apply a quasi-experimental methodology, comparing the answers to questions related to the European identity of respondents who were interviewed just before the contest with the answers of respondents who were interviewed just after the contest.

Our analysis shows that, unlike the apparent belief of many experts and a sizeable share of the population, there is little evidence that the contest provides, at least in the short run, a sizeable boost to the number of Europeans who feel European, feel EU citizens, or have a positive image of the EU. This finding emerges despite the high level of brand recognition of the contest throughout Europe, which suggests that trying to increase population-level measures of European identity through publicity campaigns is an extremely challenging task.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first discuss the literature on the drivers of European identity and consider how the contest could contribute to the formation of a European identity. We then discuss our methodology and analyse the data of three Eurobarometer surveys. Section IV concludes.
II. The Eurovision Song Contest as a driver of European identity

a. Drivers of European identity

The concept of “European identity” and the factors behind it have attracted considerable scholarly attention, not least due to the complexity of the concept. Using Tajfel (1981)’s argument about the multidimensional character of a collective identity in cognitive, evaluative and affective terms, Mitchell (2015, 332) defines European identity as follows: “In the European context, this suggests that individuals not only recognize that they are members of a group of ‘Europeans’ (cognition), but they also assign meaning (evaluation) and emotional value (affect) to that group membership (Herrmann and Brewer, 2004; Cram, 2012)”.

Mendez and Bachtler (2016) provide a comprehensive overview of the studies – both qualitative and quantitative – that analyse the determinants of European identity. In many of the quantitative studies, European identity is measured using the so-called “Moreno” question: “Do you in the near future see yourself as (nationality) only, (nationality) and European, European and (nationality) or European only?” This type of questions is argued by Mitchell (2015) to target a cognitive self-identification element, or “Identity AS Europeans”. It is also important, according to Mitchell, to assess “Identity WITH Europe”, or the “extent to which respondents identify with Europe (that is, feel an affective bond with the idea of ‘Europe’ and the community of Europeans it represents)” (Mitchell, 2015, 331). This second aspect can be assessed using questions that ask about the image Europeans have about the EU.

As micro determinants, studies identify instrumental/functionalist calculations (for example, those benefiting from EU support are more likely to identify with the project of European integration) and transnational experiences and social interactions (with more interaction leading to more identification with Europe). Mendez and Bachtler (2016) also single out the studies that factor national identities into the process of European identification. The strength of pre-existing territorial identities that exists on various levels (national and sub-national) is found to affect the formation and feeling of European identity. Similarly, the level of trust in national political institutions matters, with identification with the supranational EU-level institutions correlating with a low level of trust on the national level. Finally, Mendez and Bachtler’s (2016) summary mentions several socio-demographic characteristics identified by the relevant literature: higher levels of income, education and occupational status tend to correlate positively with levels of European identification.

Studies of macro determinants focus on exposure and persuasion. Mendez and Bachtler’s (2016) review includes studies that investigate the effect of the Euro and other European symbols, studies that analyse the effect of the EU’s media campaigns and studies that research initiatives that promote transnational interactions among Europeans. Methodologically closest to our study are studies that analyse how the salience of the EU in the media relates to indicators of support for the EU. De Vreese et al. (2016) for example relate news coverage of the EU around the 2014 Parliamentary elections in the Netherlands, to how Dutch respondents evaluate the performance of the EU. They find positive effects of exposure to news that was less negative. Similarly, Desmet et al. (2015) analysing data from around the 2009 parliamentary elections in 21 EU countries find that exposure to negative news about the EU is associated with negative evaluation of the democratic performance of the EU. Stoeckel (2011) focuses on identification with the EU (rather than support for the EU) and finds that in countries where media salience of the EU is high, individuals from higher classes are more likely to identify with the EU.
The studies closest to ours in terms of subject are those that investigate initiatives – both supported and non-supported by the EU – that promote transnational interactions among Europeans. The impact of Erasmus programme on European identity was analysed among others in Mitchell (2015). There are also some papers that argue (but not empirically test) that European football competitions positively influence European identity (see for example, Brand and Niemann (2014)). We are not aware of any empirical study linking the Eurovision Song Contest, a pan-European cultural event, to either identification with Europe or support for the EU, however.

b. The Eurovision Song Contest as a potential driver of European identity

Established in 1956, the Eurovision Song Contest is organized by the European Broadcasting Union (EBU), an alliance of public (or private but with a public service mission) radio and television stations. Most EU states have representatives in the EBU, but the EU and the EBU are generally unrelated to each other (even though the EBU is subject to the EU’s legislation and regulations; European Commission, 2000). Some EBU members are even located outside the EU. In 2015, the EBU counted 73 active members from 56 countries and 34 associate members from 20 additional countries. Most of these member countries delegate a singer from their country to represent it in the contest. These songs are then presented, one after another, in evening-long TV shows, with the winner of the contest being chosen by the population of the member states, who can cast their vote by telephone or online.¹

Economists have studied the contest before, but so far studies focus on Eurovision voting. Some explain the patterns in Eurovision voting. For example, Ginsburg and Noury (2008) study how the linguistic and cultural proximities between countries affect voting, while Spierdijk and Vellekoop (2009) focus on the impact of geography. Others estimate the influence of these voting patterns on economic outcomes. For example, Felbermayer and Toubal (2010) and Kokko and Tingvall (2014) use the cultural preferences expressed in Eurovision voting to study the impact of culture on trade. As far as we are aware, our paper is the first, however, to link the contest to the formation of European identity.

The European Song Contest (ESC), while not organized by the EU, is a very ‘European’ event. The 2015 final, for example, started with Beethoven’s ‘Ode to Joy’, the EU’s official anthem. Moreover, the theme of the 2015 Eurovision was ‘Building Bridges’, motivated as follows: “With ‘Building Bridges’ we have chosen a theme, the idea of Europe with the uniting character of music and that in Vienna, the traditional capital of world music in the heart of Europe.” (Eurovision.tv, 2014). Typically, throughout the ESC broadcasts, spectators and performers wave with the flags of the countries they support. During the televised broadcast, short video clips introduce each country’s performer in their home country setting, and then in the host country. These present various European countries for the spectators. Finally, people from throughout Europe can vote (by phone, SMS or online) for their preferred performer.²

Given this content, the contest as a possible driver of European identity can be categorized in Mendez and Bachtler’s (2016) review classification as an event that stimulates transnational

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¹ There are two semi-finals and one final.
² But one cannot vote for the performer of one’s own country.
3 Kantner (2006) defines three types of collective identity. First, “the universal we” is grounded in recognition of belonging to humankind in general and being capable of speech and action specifically (pp. 7–8). The second type is “weak collective identity”, “a shared interpretation of the situation and/or awareness of being involved in a cooperative enterprise” (p. 8). Finally, the third type is a “strong collective identity” when those who share it undertake a passionate argument for normative convictions or values. This could be triggered by a “major historical event (either catastrophic or fortunate), initiation of the collective project, or a major revision of it …” (p. 9). Eurovision clearly contributes to the first two and has the potential to contribute to the third, for example after a victory in the contest.
By blending the transnational bodies and international superstars and multicultural performers into a particular national identification, Eurovision springs these relations from national to European, and even global, which encourages the rethinking of the very idea of Citizenship. (Akšamija, 2005)

In 2016 Eurovision was awarded the Charlemagne Medal for the European Media, a prize “awarded to a European personality or institution that has contributed to European unity and the development of a European identity in the field of media in a particularly significant way”. The Chairman of the Charlemagne Medal Board of Directors, Jürgen Linden, explains the prize as follows: “On the basis of a common liking of music, millions of people celebrate one idea together, an idea resulting in one song emerging victorious. National interests and differences fade into the background as we celebrate our similarities.” Similarly, Michael Kayser, the Chairman of the Médaille Charlemagne Association, is quoted as saying, “We, the citizens of Europe, rarely get the opportunity to feel interconnected across borders. The Eurovision Song Contest presents such an opportunity” (Eurovision.tv, 2016).

It is not only experts who link the ESC to European identity. A 2013 YouGov poll (see Table 1) shows that a sizeable part of the population of the surveyed countries believes that the contest brings Europe closer together.

Table 1. Do you believe that the Eurovision Song Contest does or does not bring Europe closer together?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sample size (#)</td>
<td>1722</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>1013</td>
<td>1012</td>
<td>932</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (%)</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K. (%)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note, however, that it might not be necessary actually to watch the broadcasts of the Eurovision events themselves to be affected, as the contest is covered broadly by traditional and internet media in the period around the event. Figure 1 illustrates this well. It approximates the press coverage with the number of Google News pages for a given day when searching for “Eurovision” in May 2015. While the coverage was limited before the first semi-final (around five pages of search results), it increased quickly on the day of the final (around 20 pages of search results).
Google Trends provides further evidence for the salient profile of the Eurovision event (Figure 2). The search intensity for the word ‘Eurovision’ between 1 January and the beginning of May 2015 is very low. The intensity increases somewhat in the second week of May to reach 4 by 18 May, then hovers around 15 between 19 May (the day of the first semi-final) and 22 May to reach 100 on 23 May (the day of the final). It then drops to 88 on 24 May and 15 by 25 May.

Figure 2: Search intensity for “Eurovision” by date, May 2015
This salience of Eurovision as a pan-European event means that priming effects are possible (see Cohn and Marechal, 2016, for a review of economics studies that use priming, defined by Cohn and Marechal (2016) as ‘the activation of mental concepts through subtle situational cues’). Following this logic, with people being more aware of this pan-European event and arguably about wider Europe around the contest’s events, they might also feel more affiliated with Europe, even if they do not watch the contest.

Note that a 2016 YouGov poll suggests that almost everybody knows about the ESC and that most respondents have watched it at some point (Table 2).

Table 2: Have you ever watched the Eurovision Song Contest?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sample (#)</th>
<th>GB</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>Finland</th>
<th>Norway</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes (%)</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No (%)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.K. ESC (%)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


III. Data and methodology
   a. Data, estimation approach and basic results

To assess the impact of the contest on European identity, one cannot just compare the European identity of people who watch the contest with the European identity of those who do not. Indeed, self-selection would confuse such a comparison, as it is very likely that those who feel European are more likely to watch and follow the contest.

To assess the impact of Eurovision on European identity, ideally one would instead run an experiment that would randomly expose some people to the Eurovision “experience” (the shows and the news coverage around the shows) while others would not be exposed. The difference in European identity between the treatment and the control group would then provide a causal estimate of the impact of Eurovision. In practice this experiment would be hard to implement, because the contest is so widely discussed around the day of the final that one would have to isolate the control group for a couple of days. Self-selection into such an experiment would also be hard to avoid.

Since such an experiment is hard to implement, we follow the second-best approach and use the results of a quasi-experiment. We compare respondents who were interviewed immediately before Eurovision, and hence were not exposed to the Eurovision experience, with respondents who were interviewed immediately after Eurovision, and hence were arguably exposed to the Eurovision experience (directly or indirectly).

Such a quasi-experimental approach has been used in various settings. Metcalfe et al. (2011) use this approach to assess the impact of terrorism on happiness and find a significant negative effect of the 9/11 attacks on happiness in the UK. Bassi and Rasul (2016) evaluate the impact of a papal visit on fertility-related beliefs and behaviour, finding that the papal visit reduced individual intentions to use contraception by more than 40% relative to the pre-visit levels. Jakiela and Ozer find that post-election violence increased the risk averseness of Kenyans, while Goebel et al. (2015) show that the Fukushima disaster increased environmental concerns among Germans.
The data that we use come from the Eurobarometer surveys implemented in May 2011, 2013 and 2015 in the EU states and in the candidate countries. Since 2010, the Eurobarometer May surveys have focused on how Europeans perceive various aspects of the EU.

In 2011, 2013 and 2015, the contest took place during the survey period. For example, in 2015, the survey was implemented between 16 May and 27 May, while the semi-finals were held on 19 and 21 May and the final on the evening of Saturday 23 May.

This data set thus allows us to use a “quasi-experimental” approach. The ESC in a given year can be seen as an experimental treatment in which respondents who were interviewed before the ESC took place can serve as a control group, as they were not exposed to the treatment, and respondents who were interviewed after ESC can be considered as those receiving the treatment. Assuming that the time of the interview was determined randomly (an assumption to which we will return below), the differences between the control and the treatment group reflect the causal effect of the experimental treatment.

We can distinguish three different groups of respondents. First, we have the “untreated” respondents, who were interviewed before the first semi-final, that is, in the case of 2015, before or on 19 May 2015. For 2015, this group contains about 36% of all the respondents and consists of individuals who have not experienced the main Eurovision events. While Eurovision is a yearlong event with national qualifiers and some news about Eurovision occurring even before the start of the semi-finals, these early activities do not reach the level of exposure of the televised events. Moreover, these events throughout the year mainly focus on the national contribution to Eurovision rather than presenting the Europe-wide contestants and their backgrounds – hence, the contribution of these events to European identity (if any) is likely to be small compared with the impact of the big events.

The second group consists of the respondents interviewed between the semi-finals and the final. For 2015, they were interviewed after 19 May but before or on 23 May. This group contains about 43% of the respondents and consists of people who received some treatment but not the full treatment. The semi-finals are likely to be followed less closely, since less is at stake. Moreover, there are two semi-finals (the second took place on 21 May), each covering only some of the countries (33 countries participated in the semi-finals, 20 of which qualified for the final). Moreover, the five biggest “old” European countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom) and the organizing country (Austria in 2015) qualified automatically (as did a guest country in 2015, Australia).

Finally, the third group of respondents, those interviewed after 23 May, received the full treatment. They had the possibility to watch three televised events and be exposed to the voluminous media coverage. About 21% of all the respondents in 2015 are in this group.

We study the impact of the ESC on three questions that gauge the respondents’ European identity:

Question qd1_1 asks “Do you feel that you are a citizen of the EU?” The possible answers are “yes” (1), “to some extent” (2), “not really” (3) and “no” (4). Over the 3 years, we have about 80,000 observations for this question. Only respondents in EU countries were asked this question.

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4 The data set was downloaded from the GESIS data archive – [https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/standard-special-eb/study-overview/](https://www.gesis.org/eurobarometer-data-service/survey-series/standard-special-eb/study-overview/) – except for the 2015 survey, for which the date of the interview was not included in the GESIS data set but obtained from Kantar Public Brussels, which implements the Eurobarometer surveys.
Question qd2 asks “Do you see yourself as ...?” The possible answers are (1) the respondent’s nationality only, (2) the respondent’s nationality and European, (3) European and the respondent’s nationality and (4) only European. This question was not asked in 2011, giving us a sample of about 54,000 observations.

Some might argue not only that the contest has the potential to stimulate European identity but also that the competitive format of the contest stimulates the formation of the national identity. As we consider any answer to the above question that includes “European” as support for Europe, the score for this variable will not be affected as long as the competitive format does not destroy European identity, that is, as long as the formation of identity is not a zero-sum game and European identity is just one of the many aspects of an individual’s identity, which has meaning in certain contexts and situations.

Finally, question qa2 asks “In general, does the EU conjure up for you a very positive (1), fairly positive (2), neutral (3), fairly negative (4) or very negative image (5)?” This question was posed to the respondents in all three years, giving us a sample of about 80,000 people.5

As discussed above, Mitchell (2015) divides European identity into two aspects: “identity AS Europeans” and “identity WITH Europe”. The former refers to “self-identification as European”; the latter refers to the “extent to which respondents identify with Europe (that is, feel an affective bond with the idea of ‘Europe’ and the community of Europeans it represents)”. In our empirical work, the first two questions thus reflect “identity as European”, while the third question reflects “identity with Europe”.

For simplicity of interpretation, we collapse the answers to the three questions into binary variables that take the value one if the respondent favours Europe and zero otherwise.6

Figures 3 to 5 present the evolution of the support for Europe during the survey period, with the horizontal axis being the days to the day of the final and 0 being the date of the final. The first semi-final took place on day -4 and the second semi-final on day -2.7

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5 Unlike the first 2 questions, this question was also posed to respondents in 5 candidate countries, but we exclude these observations, focusing only on the respondents from the 28 EU member states.

6 For the first question, answers (1) and (2) are coded as 1, for the second question, any answer other than (1) is coded as 1 and, for the last question, answers (1) and (2) are coded as 1. Respondents who gave no answer are excluded from the sample.

7 While we have data from day – 8 to day + 12, we only show the days for which we have data for all the years for the sake of comparability across days.
Figure 3 suggests that there is an increase in the share of people who feel that they are European citizens starting the day before the first semi-final, then a drop during the day of the final, after which there is again an increase.
Figure 4: Evolution of the share of the respondents who see themselves as European

Figure 4 suggests that there is an increase in the share of people who feel European, starting on the day before the first semi-final and followed by an oscillating pattern.

Figure 5: Evolution of the share of the respondents who have a positive image of the EU
Figure 5 suggests that there is a decrease in the share of people who have a positive image of the EU until after the first semi-final, then an increase until the day after the final, after which there is again a decrease.

Table 3 analyses the above data more formally and presents the results of a linear probability model regression with robust standard errors, with a dummy for the period before the first semi-final and a dummy for the period after the final as explanatory variables. The comparison period is thus the period between the first semi-final and the final.

Table 3: EU identity and the Eurovision Song Contest: linear probability model results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU citizen</th>
<th>Feel European</th>
<th>EU positive image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before semi-finals</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After finals</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>80226</td>
<td>54101</td>
<td>81874</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients and standard errors are given in the table. *** means significant at the 1% significance level and * significant at the 10% level. The omitted category reflects the interview days between the first semi-final and the final.

We find that, in the period before the contest events, respondents are significantly less likely to feel like EU citizens, about 1.6 percentage points less, than in the period after the start of the ESC. Similarly, respondents are significantly less likely to feel European, about 1 percentage point less, before the final of the ESC. In contrast, after the final, the share of people with a positive image of the EU significantly decreases. While these effects move in opposite directions, the size of the effect in either direction is reasonably limited in absolute terms compared with the average level of about 37.6% of respondents who have a positive image of the EU, 65% of respondents who feel that they are EU citizens and 59% of respondents who feel European. Hence, our results suggest that, regardless of the direction of the impact of the contest, it is small at best.

b. How strong is our identification strategy?

Our identification strategy to estimate the impact of the ESC on European identity so far assumes that no other events that also could affect European identity occurred during our estimation period. Online sites (onthisday.com, 2015 current events on infoplease.com) that record major events suggest that fairly little happened in the period around the contest in 2011, 2013 and 2015. One possible confounding factor for Ireland could be the referendum on 22 May 2015 that legalized same-sex marriage (62.1% in favour), which could affect the way in which Irish respondents identify themselves with their own country (related to question 2). Similarly, the Ice Hockey Championship in May 2013 could influence the answers of respondents in the Scandinavian countries. However, even these events are likely to affect only a small part of the sample.

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8 Note that the period between May 2011 and May 2015 is characterised by large-scale ongoing crises in Europe, including the Eurozone sovereignty debt crisis inside the EU and Ukraine’s crisis in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood. In addition, ‘Europe Day’ is typically celebrated in early May in Europe. It is celebrated in the EU on May 9 (marking the date of the Schuman Declaration).
Further, to achieve random assignment to the control and treatment groups, as the analysis so far implicitly assumes, we need to assume that respondents’ date of interview is set randomly. Is this realistic?

First, it is unlikely that the respondents chose their date of interview as a function of their European identity. Thus, self-selection based on European identity is unlikely to be an issue here. However, it is possible that some of the determinants, observable or not, of European identity affect the date of the interview. While not obvious ex ante, one could generate some plausible stories. For example, more educated people (who have been found to be more Euro-minded (see for example, Chalmers and Dellmuth 2015)) could be more likely to delay their interview than less educated people.

We therefore check whether there are significant differences between the control and the treatment group in terms of the observable characteristics of the respondents, such as age, gender, self-identified socio-economic situation and level of education. A random assignment to the control or treatment group would mean that there are no significant differences in these characteristics between the control and the treatment group. At the same time, given our sample size of several tens of thousands of respondents, even small differences can be significant, so both the size and the significance of the differences need to be taken into account.

Table 4: Differences in possible control variables by the time of the interview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Before</th>
<th>Between</th>
<th>After</th>
<th>Diff. (absolute)</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Men (%)</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men (%)</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (# years)</td>
<td>48.4</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age (# years)</td>
<td>49.5</td>
<td>50.1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher educated (%)</td>
<td>31.5</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher educated (%)</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class and up (%)</td>
<td>54.5</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class and up (%)</td>
<td>51.9</td>
<td>50.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The t tests are based on unequal variances.⁹

Table 4 suggests that there are several significant differences, though typically these differences are fairly small. In the analysis below, we include these control variables in a regression analysis.

Moreover, two more variables could create non-randomness. First, the days of the week included in the control period are different from those in the treatment period. For example, the days between the semi-final and the final are always Wednesday to Saturday; hence, Mondays are never in the period between the semi-final and the final. Second, different countries have different interview schedules throughout the period, meaning that the control and the treatment group are likely to have different compositions in terms of country. Given that these different countries have different patterns in their citizens identifying with Europe and as Europeans, differences in country composition can lead to differences between the control and the treatment group. While countries are unlikely to have chosen their interview schedule as a function of their European identity, given that the number of countries is quite

⁹ Whether these t-tests are relevant is controversial (see McKenzie, 2017).
low, the chance that there is a spurious correlation between the country’s timing schedule and its patterns of its citizens identifying with Europe and as Europeans is non-negligible. In our regression analysis, we therefore also control for both the day of the week and the country of the respondent.10

Table 5 presents the results of a linear probability model with robust standard errors, with as explanatory variables a dummy for the period before the first semi-final, a dummy for the period after the final and the abovementioned control variables.

Table 5: European identity and the Eurovision Song Contest: linear probability regression results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU citizen</th>
<th>Feel European</th>
<th>EU positive image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before semi-finals</td>
<td>-0.007</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After final</td>
<td>-0.008*</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.009*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R2</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>79088</td>
<td>53303</td>
<td>80706</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients and standard errors are given in the table. *** means significant at the 1% significance level and * significant at the 10% level. The controls include country dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, age, gender and dummies for socioeconomic status and education. The omitted category reflects interview days between the first semi-final and the final.

The results in Table 5 show no significant effect of the ESC on the share of respondents who feel European. We find a small decrease, less than a percentage point drop, in the share of respondents who feel like a citizen of the EU after the final and a small increase, less than a percentage point jump, in the share of people who have a positive image of the EU. Note that all these effects are estimated quite precisely, making it unlikely that the contest has a substantial effect on the public identifying itself with Europe or as Europeans.11

**c. Reach of the Eurovision song contest**

Note further that Table 5 reflects the impact of the intention to treat rather than treatment itself. While the contest, in principle, could reach all the respondents interviewed after a given date, it is very likely that not all Europeans watch the Eurovision broadcasts or are informed about it in any other way and hence become “treated”. After the 2015 ESC, the EBU announced that:

The Eurovision Song Contest was seen by almost 200 million viewers in its 60th anniversary year. The three live shows from Vienna, Austria on 19, 21 and 23 May reached 197 million people in 40 countries – 2 million more than in 2014. The Grand

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10 In a joint test of these factors (see McKenzie, 2017), we easily reject the null of no significant coefficients. Not surprisingly, the day of the week and country explain a large chunk in the variation in the interview group to which a respondent is allocated, with other factors contributing little to the R².

11 If we use a probit model rather than an OLS model, we obtain similar results, with none of the marginal effects being significant at the 10% significance level.
Final of the 2015 Eurovision Song Contest achieved, on average, an audience share of 39.6% across 40 markets – more than double the average prime-time viewing share for the same group of channels (16.4%). (Eurovision.tv, 2015)

Hence, Eurovision is reaching a large amount of people in Europe, and in many countries the ESC final is the most popular television show on the day. However, it is important to put the “200 million viewers” number in perspective.

First, as is clear from the EBU’s “ESC TV Audience Report” (EBU, 2016), the 200 million viewers are unlikely to be 200 million unique viewers. The 2016 report suggests that 63 million people viewed the final. Assuming that the final is somewhat more popular than each of the semi-finals, the 200 million people is the sum of the number of people who viewed at least one of the three events. It is likely, however, that many of the people who viewed the semi-finals also watched the finals and hence unlikely that 200 million unique viewers watched the contest12.

Second, a market share of about 40% does not mean that 40% of all Europeans watched the final. As the data for 2016 make clear, the share of the population that watched the final is roughly about a third of the market share, as many people do not watch TV on Saturday evening (Laufer, 2016).

Note that, in addition to watching ESC on television, people can follow the ESC online or via radio. And even those who do not watch the event are likely to be exposed to it via the news in the press. As presented in Table 2, the 2016 YouGov poll revealed that only fewer than 3% of the respondents in Great Britain, Germany, France, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Norway had never heard of Eurovision. YouGov finds that large majority of respondents across these European countries had seen Eurovision at some point in the past (ranging from 70% in France to over 90% in the Nordic countries). When asked about their plans for 2016, many people intended to watch it, from 22% of the French to 54% of the Swedish respondents.

To determine whether the lack of influence of the contest is due to a lack of interest in the contest rather than because the contest fails to convince those who watch or are aware of the contest, we next restrict the sample to the countries where the contest is most popular: the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark), Belgium and the Netherlands.

Table 6 presents the results of the linear probability model regressions on the sample restricted to large-audience countries.

12 Moreover, not all of these are necessarily European.
Table 6: European identity and the ESC: linear probability model – large-audience countries only

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Feel EU citizen</th>
<th>Feel European</th>
<th>EU positive image</th>
<th>Feel EU citizen</th>
<th>Feel European</th>
<th>EU positive image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before semi-finals</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.018</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.012</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.013</td>
<td>0.017</td>
<td>0.014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After final</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.011</td>
<td>0.024*</td>
<td>0.012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.015</td>
<td>0.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R adj. sq.</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>15113</td>
<td>9969</td>
<td>15117</td>
<td>14923</td>
<td>9860</td>
<td>14923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients and standard errors are given in the table. *** means significant at the 1% significance level and * significant at the 10% level. The controls include country dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, age, gender and dummies for socioeconomic status and education. The omitted category reflects interview days between the first semi-final and the final.

If we use only the Eurovision dummies and no controls, we find small point estimates and no significant effects. If we do include controls, we find a positive significant effect on feeling European, but we find this both before the first semi-final and after the final, suggesting that the European feeling is greatest between the first semi-final and the final. We find no significant effect on feeling like an EU citizen or on having a positive image of the EU. Hence, the overall picture that we obtain is very similar to the one that we received from the full sample, which opposes the idea that there is no impact of the ESC just because it fails to reach a sizeable part of the population.

As an alternative, given that the exposure to Eurovision is likely to vary with the performance at Eurovision, we present below the results for those countries that did not participate in the event and for those countries that reached the final.

Table 7: European identity and the ESC: linear probability model – countries that did not participate versus countries that reached the final

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Countries that did not participate</th>
<th>Countries that reached the final</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feel EU citizen</td>
<td>Feel European</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Before semi-finals</td>
<td>-0.000</td>
<td>-0.029*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.017</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After final</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R adj. sq.</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>17316</td>
<td>7849</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients and standard errors are given in the table. *** means significant at the 1% significance level and * significant at the 10% level. The controls include country dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, age, gender and dummies for socioeconomic status and education. The omitted category reflects interview days between the first semi-final and the final.
Again, there is little evidence of a substantial impact of the contest. While most coefficients are insignificant and small, we do find that, in the countries that did not participate, the respondents were about 3% less likely to indicate that they feel European before the first semi-final, and, in countries that reached the finals, the respondents were a little more likely to have a positive image of the EU after the final. Note that we also experimented with a specification in which the impact of the “after-final” dummy could depend on the place that a country obtained in the final. No such interactions were significant, however.

**d. Long-run effects**

So far, we have focused on the short-run impact of Eurovision. One could argue, however, that, rather than there being an immediate impact of the event, the impact could be delayed. For this, we added the data from the November Eurobarometer surveys of 2011, 2013 and 2015, which have the same questions as the May survey. Table 8 reruns the regressions of Tables 3 and 5 using this larger data set and adds a November dummy.

Table 8: European identity and the ESC: linear probability model using a sample including data from November 2011, 2013 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU citizen</th>
<th>Feel European</th>
<th>EU positive image</th>
<th>EU citizen</th>
<th>Feel European</th>
<th>EU positive image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before semi-finals</td>
<td>-0.016***</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After finals</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>0.010*</td>
<td>-0.014***</td>
<td>-0.003</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.011***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>-0.012***</td>
<td>-0.021***</td>
<td>-0.042***</td>
<td>-0.017***</td>
<td>-0.018***</td>
<td>-0.032***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R adj. sq.</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.11</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>135130</td>
<td>108425</td>
<td>163791</td>
<td>133,045</td>
<td>106,709</td>
<td>14923</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Coefficients and standard errors are given in the table. *** means significant at the 1% significance level and * at the 10% level. The controls include country dummies, day-of-the-week dummies, age, gender and dummies for socioeconomic status and education. The omitted category reflects interview days between the first semi-final and the final.

Interestingly, while this does not affect the general impression that the immediate impact of the contest is hard to observe, we obtain smaller levels of EU identification in November than in May across different specifications. The difference is still relatively modest, ranging from -1.7 to -3.2 percentage points, depending on the question.

To determine whether this higher level of EU identification in May can be observed over a longer period, we next focus on the image question. This question, unlike the two other questions, has been asked regularly since 2000. Table 9 below provides the results of an OLS regression, regressing the share of people who have a positive image of the EU (defined as above) in a country on an indicator for the period of the survey, using the November survey as

---

13 Note that if we do a year-by-year analysis, rather than pooling the data from all years, we get significant negative coefficients in only 3 of 6 years.
a benchmark.\textsuperscript{14} We include country-year fixed effects and hence compare the survey results for a given country in a given year.

Table 9: Is there a May effect?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2000–2016</th>
<th>Before 2010</th>
<th>2010 and later</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb.–April survey</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
<td>-0.002</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May survey</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.005</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.015***</td>
<td>0.02***</td>
<td>0.015***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sept.–Oct. survey</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year-country effects</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R adj. sq.</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.96</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We exclude the 2000, 2001 and 2009 surveys, since only one survey including the image question in those years. OLS regression with robust standard errors. The benchmark in the first and third columns is November and that for the second column is September–October.

Table 9 suggests that the May survey effect can be observed both in the overall sample and when we break up the sample into the periods before and after 2010. From 2010, surveys were consistently conducted in May and November, while, before 2010, the month of the survey varied. Interestingly, other months are not significantly different from November.

One could argue that the fact that we observe a somewhat stronger pro-European stance in May suggests a positive effect of the song contest; that is, the contest has a somewhat long-run effect, even though we do not see much of an effect over the various stages of the contest. At the same time, one can easily produce alternative explanations; for example, the Europe Day celebrations on May 9th which mark the date of the Schuman Declaration could contribute to such increase as well.

IV. Conclusions

In this paper, we investigate whether the ESC, the biggest pan-European music festival, provides a boost to European identity, increasing the identification of EU citizens with Europe and as Europeans. We use data from several waves of the Eurobarometer surveys with several tens of thousands of respondents and a quasi-experimental methodology, comparing the answers of respondents who were interviewed just before and after the contest. While we find some evidence that respondents to surveys in May, when the contest takes place, are somewhat more likely to identify with Europe than respondents to surveys in other months of the year, we find no substantial increase around the days of the contest in May in the share of respondents who feel European, feel like an EU citizen or have a positive image of the EU. This suggests that anybody who counts on creating substantial Europe-wide increases in European identification with Europe and as Europeans through a publicity campaign is likely to be disappointed.

\textsuperscript{14} The data were downloaded from http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Chart/getChart/themeKy/19/groupKy/102
References


Chalmers, Adam William and Lisa Maria Dellmuth (2015), The effect of EU spending on support for the integration process depends on how ‘European’ citizens feel, 4 August http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europablog/2015/08/04/the-effect-of-eu-spending-on-support-for-the-integration-process_depends_on_how_european_citizens_feel/


