Class Information

Economics 336: Public Economics II (Public Choice)

2009 Edition (second semester)

Times and places

Class meets Mondays. 2:00-4:00, Commerce 118

Tutorial Sessions: Thursday 11-12, Room C536; Thursday 1-2, Room C540.

Mid-semester exam: Note revised date 6:30 - 9:30, Thursday, 20 August, S5

• News
• Course synopsis
• Summary of course assessment
• Readings
• Syllabus and reading list 2009 Edition

News!

Update 10 August 2009. Study questions for the upcoming midterm. Share and enjoy! I'm likely to add in some questions about stuff from the Stearns and Zywicki readings (and Riker) that folks in tutorials demonstrated not having read. For folks having a hard time getting to the Cowen Cowen Tabarrok reading, try this link: An Analysis of Proposals for Constitutional Change in New Zealand. The link is identical to the one in your syllabus, but hitting the link in the PDF can have problems because the URL wraps several lines and Adobe doesn't handle that well at all.

Update 28 July 2009 Yesterday we went over cycling. For those unimpressed by my whiteboard drawing abilities, please check a prettier MS Paint version, here.

Update 24 July 2009 First, please note the revised exam date. There were clashes with two other courses for the initially proposed date. There should be no clashes with the new one. Thursday, 20 August, 6:30-9:30.

Second, folks have asked for some references on anarchy in Somalia. Here's some interesting ones!

• Powell, Benjamin, Ryan Ford and Alex Nowrasteh. 2008. "Somalia after state collapse: chaos or improvement?" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization.
• Leeson, Peter. 2007. "Better off stateless: Somalia before and after government collapse." Journal of Comparative Economics.

Update 12 July 2009 We're soon on again. I'm looking forward to a great year ahead. Last year's iteration was a lot of fun; hoping this year's matches it. I've updated a few of the readings in the meantime, including adding some great ones by William Riker. See y'all Monday!

Public Choice applies economic theory and methodology to the study of nonmarket decision-making (typically political decision-making). As economists, we look not to the benevolence of the butcher for our meat but rather to his self-interest. What happens when we realize that politicians and voters are no different? Simply put, we achieve a much better understanding of real-world policy, economic and otherwise. The course provides an overview of positive and normative public choice theory, highlighting work in the economic theory of constitutions, voting rules, bureaucracy, democracy, collective action, dictatorship, the theory of clubs, expressive voting, political business cycles, lobbying, legislative structures, political competition, as well as criticisms of public choice theory. A familiarity with algebra is assumed on the part of students, as is a strong background in microeconomic theory; I will attempt to keep the calculus to lim x --> e (very little).

Evaluation will consist of:

• a midterm exam - 30%
• a take-home final exam (you'll be likely to have 2 days to complete a set of short essays and questions totalling about 15 typed pages) - 40%
• three short assignments (often asking you to provide me with Kiwi case studies illustrating and applying the concepts discussed in class - 20% total
• participation in in-class discussion and debate. - 10%

See the reading list for the assigned readings. There is only one required text for purchase. You can get it now from Amazon, cheap! Or, you can wait 'till the last minute and pay Book Store prices.

• Caplan, Bryan. 2007. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies. Princeton University Press. $19.77 US from Amazon as of 25 January 2008.

This course is taught very much in the arts tradition within economics. What does that mean?

• First, it means lots of reading. I expect you to do each week's readings and to come to the tutorials ready to argue about them. I'll be calling on people in the tutorials to discuss the readings; expect to be embarrassed if you haven't read them. As 10% of your grade comes from participating in the discussions, it's best that you read the papers.
• Second, it means that assignments and tests will focus on analysis of arguments using concepts developed in the class. There will be no "turn the handle on the equation to solve the problem" type questions; questions will look more like:
  • "Why do we have government?"
  • "Explain the concept of voting cycles and why they're considered to be a problem"
  • "Why might PR be a better idea in Presidential than Parliamentary systems?".
  These require well written, well thought out answers that apply the concepts from class and present them in coherent, correct English. I severely downgrade assignments and exams that are poorly written. The take-home exam will consist of a mix of short and long answer questions; the long answer questions essentially consist of short (4 page) essays.
• Finally, it means that I lecture during the lectures. I don't write very much down on the board and I don't provide hand-out notes. You have to pay attention and sort out for yourself which bits are most important to write down. I will provide a skeleton lecture outline on the whiteboard prior to class; the rest is up to you. You might want to record the lectures.

I'm looking forward to meeting you in a few weeks; last year's Econ 336 was great fun and I hope that this year's will be as well. Get ready to do lots of reading and debating of the topics...see you soon!

Please feel free to contact me via email if you have any questions about the class or if you're wondering about taking it. Also check out the page I maintained for last year's Econ 336 class as that gives a decent feel for what the class is like. Hope to see you in the spring!

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