Distributive Politics In A Strong Party System:

Evidence From Canadian Job Grant Programs

Eric Crampton
University of Canterbury
eric.crampton@canterbury.ac.nz

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Abstract: The distributive politics literature following Weingast (1979) predicts majoritarian redistribution within strong party systems. This prediction is tested using evidence from Canadian job creation grant programs active during the mid-1990s. Results provide strong evidence *against* the hypothesis of generalized majoritarian redistribution. Districts represented by the governing Liberal Party received *lower* grant allocations than did other districts, both absolutely and conditional on the unemployment variables on which allocation decisions were to have been made. However, districts represented by vulnerable Cabinet Ministers received disproportionate allocations, as did Liberal districts in western Canada. Evidence supports the swing voter hypothesis in the west, with weak support for the loyal voter hypothesis elsewhere.

"For 25 years, the people of Lac-St.-Jean and Chicoutimi were promised roads by
the former Jonquière MP [Lucien Bouchard, former head of the Bloc Quebecois].
Now that they have a Liberal MP, they have hope."

Jean Chrétien[1]

"To the victors belong the spoils."

Dick Armey[2]

I. Introduction

Representation by the majority party has its privileges, or so the story goes. In
order to better secure its hold on government, the winning party will reward its
supporters at the expense of its opponents. But how should the majority party make
best use of its position? Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003) survey the theoretical
literature and find two broad patterns: the winning party may concentrate its spending
in electorally pivotal districts, seeking critical "swing voters" (Lindbeck and Weibull,
1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Persson and Tabellini, 2000), or may focus its
efforts on areas where it enjoys stronger support, rewarding "loyal supporters"
(Kramer, 1964; Cox and McCubbins, 1986). Of course, both theoretical predictions
stand in opposition to Weingast's (1979; also Weingast, Shepsle and Johnson, 1981,
and Schwartz, 1994) suggestion that universalistic norms will prevail in weak party
systems, though they conform to Shepsle and Weingast's (1981) caveat concerning
strong party systems.

In political systems characterized by strong party discipline, we expect that the
governing party will use its prerogative to reward its supporters and potential
supporters at the expense of supporters of its opponents. In single-member district
systems, distributive politics will reward districts represented by members of the
majority party at the expense of those represented by members of minority parties.
The strand of the distributive politics literature that follows Weingast in finding
universalist norms carries with it Shepsle and Weingast's (1981) caveat that, in strong
party systems, universalism is expected among districts represented by the majority
party[3], implying transfers from minority party districts to be distributed among

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[1] In response to a question in the House of Commons from Michel Gauthier (Bloc Quebecois MP)
regarding federal infrastructure spending in Quebec. See Wells (2002).
[2] Quoted in Ansolabehere and Snyder (2003) p. 1, responding to a press report that the GOP had
redirected substantial amounts of spending to its own districts following the 1994 election.
[3] Shepsle and Weingast (1981) argue that uncertainty over the composition of subsequent legislatures
may lead to broad-based universalism even in strong party systems. But, since nothing binds the

majority party districts. And, of course, the minimum winning coalition literature (Riker, 1962; Baron and Ferejohn, 1989) is quite compatible with redistribution favoring districts held by the majority party in a strong party system; in such cases, the majority party forms the coalition.

The Canadian political system is characterized by very strong party discipline. Longley (1998) argues that party discipline in the Canadian parliament borders on absolute. Given an executive (the Cabinet) comprised of members of the largest party in the House of Commons and whose tenure depends on the maintenance of their party's preeminent status in the Commons, Cabinet members will have a strong incentive to target government programs to enhance the electoral success of MPs of their own party. We expect then not only that legislation will explicitly favor government-held districts, but also that any political discretion in the distribution of funds under the various federal programs will be used to the benefit of electoral districts held by the governing party. Whether funds are targeted towards loyal districts or swing districts, however, remains theoretically ambiguous.

This paper examines the distribution of Canadian job creation grants in the mid 1990s and finds no evidence of generalized transfers favoring majority-held districts. Indeed, the broad pattern indicates the exact opposite. However, there is strong evidence that particular important ridings were targeted by the governing party for augmented spending, and that distributive politics worked entirely as predicted in Western Canada. These findings are surprising, and should spark further research into the workings of distributive politics in the Canadian setting.

The distribution of federal job creation grants has been a subject of much controversy. Allegations of improprieties in the management of grants at Human Resources Development Canada (HRDC) led to an audit of HRDC grants and the publication of a rich data set including the date and value of grants awarded to each electoral district. While grants were to have been awarded to businesses in high unemployment areas of Canada, allegations of political interference in the distribution of grants have figured prominently on the front pages of Canadian newspapers in recent years.[4] While HRDC was to have formally decided which job creation projects

Opposition Party to hold to universalism in future periods, nothing will compel the current governing party to engage in universalism in this model.

[4] For example, see Andrew Macintosh, "Bloc Challenges Stewart to reveal recipient's invoices", National Post, May 4, 2000. The article reports that a bankrupt company in the Prime Minister's riding was awarded a job creation grant in 1998 though documents showed it was ineligible for the funds.

would be allocated federal funds, a parallel approval process internal to the governing Liberal Party was found to be operating (Fife and Macintosh, 2000). Opposition parties and the press argued that the grant programs amounted to little more than a means of buying votes for the Liberal Party (Macintosh, 2000b). An audit of the HRDC grants by the Auditor General of Canada (Auditor General, 2000) found gross improprieties in the management of the job grant programs and in the procedures used to determine grant distribution. Consequently, the distribution of job grant funds through HRDC should prove a convincing test of whether discretion in pork barrel projects disproportionately favors districts held by the governing party; ample slack was available in the operation of the program for the governing Liberals to implement their desired pattern of program expenditures.

Section II reviews Canadian parliamentary structure, the program whose spending is here analyzed, and develops hypotheses to be tested. Section III presents our data, which is analyzed in Section IV. Section V concludes.

II. Background

Canada is governed by a Westminsterian parliamentary system that has enjoyed a Liberal Party governing majority since 1993, when widespread popular disapproval of the governing Progressive Conservative Party and the breakdown of its regional coalition reduced it from a strong majority to two seats in the House of Commons. The Liberal Party, drawing support mainly from Ontario and from the East in 1993, earned a narrow majority victory in 1997 despite losing many of its seats in the Maritime Provinces. The Liberal Party earned a stronger majority in the general election of 2000. As is the case in Westminsterian systems, the governing party in the Canadian House of Commons controls both the legislative and executive branches of government. The Prime Minister forms a Cabinet, typically drawn from sitting MPs from his own party, to oversee the various and sundry departments of the federal government. The Deputy Minister appointed in each department, whose tenure depends on the support of his Minister, controls the bureaucracy and implements policy objectives specified by the Minister. The Cabinet formed by the Prime Minister consequently enjoys a rather large degree of discretion in setting and implementing policy.

Internal HRDC emails claimed that the Prime Minister's Office ordered them to do "everything legally possible" to get the grant to the bankrupt company, owned by a friend of the Prime Minister.

In response to changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act that would more severely affect residents of high unemployment regions of the country, the Liberal government initiated the Transitional Jobs Fund (TJF) in 1996. During its three-year mandate, the TJF was to target three hundred million dollars toward private sector and community job creation in regions with unemployment in excess of twelve percent, some two percentage points higher than the national average. Firms could seek federal funding through the TJF for projects that would create new, sustainable jobs by applying through their regional HRDC office. HRDC requirements demanded that at least half of the funds necessary for the firm's project come from the private sector or from other government departments. The approval of the local Member of Parliament was also an important factor in determining an applicant's success.[5] The Canada Jobs Fund (CJF) succeeded the TJF in 1999 with annual funding of $110 million targeting regions with unemployment exceeding ten percent.[6]

Individual Members of Parliament have a rather strong interest in assisting local firms in receiving job grants through either the TJF or the CJF. In both cases, a role for the local Member of Parliament was explicitly written into the funding approval process, assisting the local MP in appropriating credit for the federal fund allocation. As backbench and Opposition Members of Parliament can have little to no role in policy formation, "constituency service" functions become an important margin along which MPs can work to increase their visibility, public recognition, and chances of electoral success (Longley, 1999).[7] Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that increased federal funding correlates with increased support for the incumbent in the subsequent election.[8] For government backbenchers, securing a job creation grant can help in showing constituents the benefits of being represented by a member of the

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[5] This is, of course, not to suggest that the local MP might seek to veto a local spending project. Rather, the relative importance of the local MP, we argue, becomes an explicit part of the decision-making process. The HRDC bureaucracy is more apt to take notice of an application with the imprimatur of a cabinet minister than one with the signature of a nameless backbencher. And, the process provides a direct mechanism through which the local MP can plausibly appropriate credit with voters for any local program spending.

[6] Average unemployment fell from 9.6 percent in 1996 to 7.6 percent in 1999.

[7] Longley cites studies by Kornberg and Mishler (1976) and by Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina (1979, 1983, 1987) showing the importance of constituency service to MPs. While Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina explore the role of constituency service in Great Britain, tighter party discipline in Canada than in Great Britain would tend to magnify their findings rather than diminish them in application to Canada.

[8] Levitt and Snyder analyze spending in an American context, though the principle should extend to Canada.

governing party.[9] For Opposition members, a job grant can provide credible evidence of the MP's effectiveness despite not being in the government.

Given the Canadian political structure and given the job grant approval process set by Cabinet and by HRDC guidelines, we expect political involvement in TJF/CJF along several fronts. First, we expect that MPs are rational actors and that their differing incentives will prove important in determining grant allocations. All Members of Parliament will lobby strongly for proposed projects in their districts, but those elected by narrow margins in the previous election and expecting to contest the next election will have added incentive to do so. Levitt and Snyder (1997) find that a hundred-dollar increase in per capita federal spending in a district corresponds to a two percent increase in incumbent vote share in the subsequent election. We consequently expect the data to reveal higher grant allocations to districts represented by Members seeking re-election in the forthcoming election and to districts won by narrow margins of victory.

MPs are heterogeneous in ability, however; some are more able to win grants for their constituents than are others. More "able" MPs should bring home more money than their counterparts. Assuming that ability is correlated across the different dimensions of an MP's activities, we proxy ability as MP membership in either the cabinet or shadow cabinet of his or her party.[10]

Second, given the Auditor General's findings of gross improprieties in the administration of grants and given press reports of a parallel Liberal Party grant approval process (Macintosh, 2000b) outside of the HRDC approval channels, we expect that the governing Liberals were able to turn this available slack to partisan advantage. Not only do we expect that the legislation itself was designed to favour Liberal districts, which would be evidenced by a higher percentage of Liberal districts

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[9] Indeed, Prime Minister Chretien announced to the House of Commons, in response to a question from Michel Gauthier (Bloc Quebecois MP) regarding federal infrastructure spending in Quebec, that "For 25 years, the people of Lac-St.-Jean and Chicoutimi were promised roads by the former Jonquière MP [Lucien Bouchard, former head of the Bloc Quebecois]. Now that they have a Liberal MP, they have hope." See Wells (2002).

[10] Shadow cabinets are necessarily less exclusive than the Cabinet of the governing party. No one party had even half of the number of seats of the Liberals in either Parliament here analyzed, but all Cabinet positions are criticized. To replicate the selection effect of Cabinet status, we calculated the percentage of Liberal members in Cabinet in each Parliament, then selected that percentage of "most important" shadow cabinet members from each opposition party in each Parliament. This process is necessarily arbitrary as no official ranking exists listing the importance of various shadow portfolios to different parties; also, as some opposition MPs hold several Shadow Cabinet portfolios, even if such an official listing existed, it would need be cardinal in nature rather than simply ordinal in order to rank the importance of shadow critics. In later work we will test the sensitivity of our results to the particular Members chosen as "most important".

meeting the unemployment criteria, but we also expect that Liberal districts received higher allocations after correcting for unemployment. In particular, we expect that Cabinet members are able to win more grants for their ridings than are the top members of the Opposition Shadow Cabinets, since Cabinet Ministers hold far more sway with bureaucrats in any department than do members of Shadow Cabinet. Also, as the defeat of a Cabinet Minister costs a governing party more than the defeat of a backbench MP, we expect that Cabinet Ministers in risk of losing seats will receive higher allocations than similar backbenchers. Significant differences in allocations to Cabinet ministers and top members of Shadow Cabinets would point to partisan influences in grant distribution. [11]

Finally, if political slack sufficient for the exercise of broad discretionary power by the Liberals had existed, we would also expect higher allocations to firms making larger campaign contributions to the Liberal Party. While the data to examine this third claim directly is not available, we could expect that this form of distortion would also be revealed in higher allocations to Liberal ridings. Large corporate donations to the Liberal Party can be rewarded through grants to branch offices or subsidiaries; if discretion were available, grants would be made to local offices in Liberal districts. And, the rewarding of donations to local candidates would be expected to be more heavily concentrated in Liberal districts. While the lack of data linking contributors to grants prevents us from affirming the existence of distortionary distribution to contributors [12], the finding of no distortionary distribution to Liberal ridings might cast some doubt on allegations of this form of impropriety.

Whether funds should be targeted towards swing districts or should reward loyal districts remains ambiguous. Ansolabehere and Snyder [13] (2003) discuss each strategy. In swing voter models, turnout is typically fixed and efforts are concentrated on converting marginal voters in pivotal districts or regions. Loyal voter models are driven by one of three mechanisms: distribution of rents to members and supporters;

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[11] An alternative explanation here exists, however; Cabinet Ministers have much larger budgets than members of Shadow Cabinets. Consequently, differences in funding may reflect differences in resources available within Members' offices to promote local causes.

[12] Doing so would require tracking the majority shareholders of each company awarded a job creation grant, including those identified only as numbered corporations ("3393062 Canada inc.", for example), and correlating them with individual and corporate contributors to the Liberal Party. Another impediment to testing a campaign contributions link to funding decisions is that we have data only on those firms awarded grants; we cannot test whether Liberal donors were more likely to be awarded grants given that we have no data on those firms which failed in their applications.

[13] They find spending by U.S. state governments closely follows the loyal voter hypothesis.

mobilization of voters; or, ensuring a clear signal as to whom credit should be awarded for spending. The voter mobilization mechanism, however, should not play out in the Canadian context because of Canada's Parliamentary structure; no elected official faces a larger electorate than his or her home riding. We might expect that swing voter models will be more operative in areas where the governing Liberals are quite weak, such as the West, and that loyal voter models would be more important where there are additional benefits from ensuring a clear signal exists tying local spending to the federal Liberals, such as in Quebec.

In sum, had political influence played as large a role as the distributive politics literature predicts, and as claimed by the press, in determining the allocation of job creation funds, we should expect the data to reveal either or both of two patterns. First, Liberal districts would have been more likely to be eligible for funds and, consequently, would then received higher allocations than other districts. Second, the data would reveal that, correcting for unemployment, Liberal Members of Parliament brought more money home than did members of the opposition parties. We can also then test whether spending patterns within Liberal districts conform more closely to "swing voter" or "loyal voter" hypotheses.

III. The Data

The job creation grant scandal prompted the release of a wealth of data on the distribution of job grants administered by Human Resources Development Canada. Data sorted by the electoral district of the sponsoring Member of Parliament is available for HRDC spending through the Transitional Jobs Fund (TJF), which ran from July 1996 through March 1999, and through the Canada Jobs Fund (CJF), which began when the TJF expired and ended in June of 2000. Job grant allocations per district were totaled for the periods prior to and following the 1997 Canadian General Election, resulting in two observations per electoral district.[14]

As time-series data on unemployment by electoral district is not collected by Statistics Canada, estimates were constructed based on the unemployment data by

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[14] A complication exists in a redistricting that occurred prior to the 1997 general election. The total number of seats in the House of Commons expanded from 295 to 301. Demographic and economic data for post-1997 ridings were mapped onto pre-1997 ridings by examining which post-1997 district the pre-1997 district mapped onto, usually by following which ridings incumbent MPs chose to run in for the 1997 election. Mappings made available online by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation allowed imputed margins of victory from the 1993 election to be calculated.

economic region reported by Statistics Canada.[15] As economic regions are generally larger than electoral districts, most districts fall into a single economic region. When a district overlapped multiple economic regions, the figures corresponding to the region with the higher level of unemployment were taken. A variable was constructed indicating whether the district met the unemployment threshold during all, part, or none of the electoral period.[16] We also tracked the amount by which unemployment exceeded threshold levels.[17] We would expect this variable to be positive and significant not only because it reflects underlying constituent demand for programs, but also because it may be taken into account by HRDC in funding allocation decisions.

A potential problem in all CJF and TJF data is that, while funds allocated through HRDC are listed, a separate category exists for other funds tied to the specific job creation program. While this might be assumed to consist of industry matching funds, it is possible that the additional funds come from other departments of the federal government. If significant portions of funding of projects come from other parts of the federal government, and if these funds are not distributed evenly with HRDC projects, bias is likely in the following results. Specifically, if the workings of distributive politics played out in the allocation of matching funds from other parts of the government rather than in the allocation of funds through the TJC/CJF programs, any such effects will not be found through analysis of this dataset. A richer data set than is available would be necessary for the correction of this problem.[18]

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[15] Districts were mapped onto economic regions by examining maps of both types of region provided by Elections Canada and by Statistics Canada. There were, on average, 3.6 electoral districts per employment district (median= 2.8, standard deviation= 2.3).

[16] Monthly unemployment data was grouped into semi-annual observations. An indicator was constructed to show whether the maximum unemployment rate in the economic region corresponding to the electoral district met the threshold level of the program in the six-month period before, during, or following a half-year observation. The average value of this variable over an electoral period was then taken.

[17] With negative values indicating that levels did not meet the threshold. This variable was used rather than a simple unemployment measure because the target unemployment rate changed over the time period. As the meeting of threshold unemployment levels was a statutorily-necessary precondition for grant allocations, applicants would pick the highest possible unemployment level in making their application. As then expected, regressions using maximum-unemployment figures yielded better fits than those using average-unemployment figures, and so the maximal value of the excess unemployment figures was chosen.

[18] An HRDC background paper on the Transitional Jobs Fund notes that HRDC funds made up 14% of total project spending, other federal spending made up an additional 10%, provincial and municipal government contributions totalled 33% of spending, and private sector contributions made up 39% of spending. Fundraising and donations comprised the remaining 4%.

Table 1.1: Sorted Summary Statistics

	Overall	Close District	Districts receiving program	West	Ontario	Quebec	East
Liberal (Lib)							
Number of observations	333	34	94	45	201	45	42
Proportion of time districts met unemployment threshold [*Threshold*]	0.30 [0.45]	0.35 [0.47]	0.79 [0.38]	0.03 [0.11]	0.13 [0.33]	0.81 [0.36]	0.87 [0.31]
Proportion of districts receiving a program [*Program*]	0.28 [0.45]	0.38 [0.49]		0.2 [0.41]	0.11 [0.32]	0.58 [0.50]	0.86 [0.35]
Proportion of districts won by a narrow margin of victory (<5%) in the previous election [*narrow*]	0.10 [0.30]		0.14 [0.35]	0.27 [0.45]	0.04 [0.21]	0.13 [0.34]	0.17 [0.38]
Dollar allocations to a district (thousands) [*Dol*]	458 [1119]	910 [1761]	1624 [1599]	164 [492]	193 [639]	995 [1756]	1465 [1670]
Canadian Alliance/Reform Party (CA)							
Number of observations	111	11	28	110	1	0	0
Threshold	0.11 [0.26]	0.00 [0.00]	0.25 [0.36]	0.11 [0.26]	0	.	.
Program	0.25 [0.44]	0.27 [0.47]		0.25 [0.44]	0	.	.
Narrow	0.10 [0.30]		0.11 [0.31]	0.09 [0.29]	1	.	.
Dol	225 [570]	93 [213]	894 [841]	228 [573]	0	.	.
Bloc Quebecois (BQ)							
Number of observations	96	7	59	0	0	96	0
Threshold	0.69 [0.34]	0.64 [0.48]	0.79 [0.31]	.	.	0.69 [0.39]	.
Program	0.61 [0.49]	0.71 [0.49]		.	.	0.61 [0.49]	.
Narrow	0.07 [0.26]		0.08 [0.28]	.	.	0.07 [0.26]	.
Dol	890 [1926]	2719 [5867]	1448 [2292]	.	.	890 [1926]	.
Progressive Conservative (PC)							
Number of observations	22	5	17	1	1	7	14
Threshold	0.69 [0.41]	0.37 [0.51]	0.86 [0.26]	0	0	0.39 [0.46]	0.92 [0.14]
Program	0.77 [0.43]	0.40 [0.548]		0	0	0.5 [0.55]	1.00 [0.00]
Narrow	0.23 [0.43]		0.12 [0.33]	1	0	0.67 [0.52]	0.00 [0.00]
Dol	2365 [2708]	714 [1096]	2918 [2615]	0	0	694 [982]	3420 [2851]
New Democratic Party (NDP)							
Number of observations	27	10	10	19	0	0	8
Threshold	0.20 [0.37]	0.3 [0.42]	0.40 [0.52]	0.08 [0.19]	.	.	0.5 [0.53]
Program	0.37 [0.49]	0.5 [0.53]		0.11 [0.32]	.	.	1.00 [0.00]
Narrow	0.37 [0.49]		0.50 [0.53]	0.32 [0.48]	.	.	0.50 [0.53]
dol	1073 [2247]	1116 [1457]	2896 [2954]	204 [619]	.	.	3135 [3297]

Standard deviation is listed in brackets under the mean value in each cell. Columns represent varying subsamples of the data, including closely-won districts (<5% margin of victory); districts receiving programs, and regional subsamples. Rows are sorted by political party, indicated in bold above each set of variables.

IV. Analysis

In Table 1.1, column 1 (below), we see that 30% of Liberal districts meet the HRDC threshold levels for program allocation,[19] significantly less than the proportion of opposition districts meeting the threshold. Thirty-eight percent of all other districts met the threshold, significantly greater than the Liberal's 30% in a one-tailed test (t=2.26). Restricting the sample to those districts won by less than 5% of the popular vote, 35% of closely-won Liberal districts meet the threshold compared to 27% of opposition districts. The difference, however, is not statistically significant. We can then reject the hypothesis that the program included any legislative bias in favour of Liberal districts, as Liberal districts were not more likely to be eligible for job creation grants. Distributive politics predictions of redistribution favouring Liberal districts would then need to be fulfilled through the actual administration of the program.

The summary statistics presented in Table 1.1 provide no evidence of preferential treatment of Liberal-held districts. While 28% of Liberal districts receive program allocations, 45% of Opposition-held districts receive funding.[20] Of course, if Liberal districts were far less eligible to receive funds, such a difference would not constitute evidence against a bias favouring the Liberals. However, 79% of Liberal districts receiving funds met our measure of the unemployment threshold, compared to only 64% of opposition districts.[21] The ratio of districts receiving allocations to districts qualifying for allocations should reflect any gross improprieties in funding decisions. If a higher proportion of eligible Liberal districts in fact received funding, we would have reason to suspect that available slack in program administration was used to the benefit of the Liberals. However, no such evidence is found in the summary statistics. If anything, the statistics suggest a bias *against* Liberal-held districts. Where the ratio of districts receiving funding to districts eligible for funding stands at 1.0 for the Liberal Party, the comparable ratios for the Opposition parties are 2.29 for the Canadian Alliance, 0.89 for the Bloc Quebecois, 1.12 for the Progressive Conservatives and 1.85 for the NDP. On the whole, Liberal districts seem less likely than other districts to receive funding.

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[19] Of course, the *threshold* standard is only a proxy for meeting HRDC guidelines; local unemployment levels may diverge from regional unemployment data.
[20] The difference is significant at the 1% level in a one-tailed test (t=3.85).
[21] The difference is significant at the 1% level in a one-tailed test (t=2.75).

Other simple tests on the summary statistics reveal no bias favouring Liberal-held districts. A measure was constructed to indicate whether a district received funding when it failed to meet the threshold level of unemployment. Liberal districts are less likely than others to receive program allocations when threshold unemployment levels fail to be met, and the difference is significant at the 1% level. When the sample is restricted to those districts receiving grant allocations, Liberal districts receive slightly less money than those held by the Progressive Conservatives or by the NDP, but more than those held by the Canadian Alliance. Over the set of all districts, Liberal districts receive an average of $277,000 *less* than other districts in an electoral period; the difference is significant at the one percent level.

Distinct regional patterns are found in the sorted data. Liberals enjoy a strong funding advantage in the west; some three percent of western Liberal observations met the unemployment threshold, while 20% of western Liberal observations received funding. The comparable ratio for the Alliance is 11% meeting the threshold to 25% receiving funding. Compared to other Liberal districts, higher proportions of western districts were won by a narrow margin in the previous election and received funding when the unemployment threshold is not met. The ratio of districts receiving funding to districts eligible for funding is smaller in Quebec than that in any other region. While opposition parties suggested a bias favouring Quebec, and in particular the Prime Minister's riding, far fewer eligible Quebec ridings receive *any* money than do eligible western ridings. Of course, high allocations in the Prime Minister's riding are troubling; while the Prime Minister's district received some $8.5 million in grants, the prairie provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta received a total of $15.2 million. While it could be argued that discrimination against western provinces was implicit in the unemployment thresholds established, a hypothesis of discrimination against the west in the actual administration of the program seems unlikely to be supported given these summary statistics.

Econometric Analysis

The summary statistics provide little evidence of bias favouring the governing Liberals. Liberal districts were not more likely to be eligible for program funding, nor were they more likely to receive funding when unemployment criteria were not met, except when compared in the west to Canadian Alliance districts.

Tobit specifications were run to determine whether, correcting for the unemployment levels on which program allocation decisions were required to have been made, Liberal districts received higher allocations than other districts.[22] Note in the summary statistics above that approximately 65% of federal electoral districts were not allocated a TJF or CJF grant during an observation period. Since we wish to account not only for the quantity of funds allocated to districts receiving grants but also for the selection of which districts will receive any grants at all, the Tobit model is most appropriate. I estimate the following baseline specification using Tobit:

Thousands of dollars allocated to a district during an electoral cycle =
a + f * *(unemployment variables)* + g * *(regional indicators, population and parliamentary controls)* + j * *(political variables)* + b * *(party identification variables and interactions)*

Unemployment variables include whether the threshold level was met, and by how much that threshold was exceeded.[23] Control variables include regional[24] dummies, district population, and an indicator denoting whether the observation is pre or post the 1997 election. Political variables include the MP's margin of victory in the previous election, whether the MP runs for re-election in the subsequent election, and whether the MP has been selected into the Cabinet or Shadow Cabinet of his or her party. Party identification and interactions between party identification and margin of victory are also included. Results from national level specifications are reported in Tables 1.2 below. Regional-level results are presented in the Appendix. Specifications 1 and 2 in Table 1.2, below, provide baseline results that remain remarkably consistent when we introduce political and partisan variables in later specifications. Meeting the unemployment threshold raises expected grant allocations by about $2.8 million; every percentage point increase in unemployment above the threshold yields about $100,000 in extra grant money. Constituencies with lower population levels received higher grants[25], and more money was distributed after the 1997 election than before it. All regions of the country received higher expected grants than did Ontario, the region omitted in the specifications below, with districts

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[22] Probit and OLS specifications were also run but revealed no substantial differences from Tobit specifications.
[23] Both measures are important as the threshold level changes over the period.
[24] While regional dummies are often significant, the coefficients of interest on other variables do not change substantially when the regional dummies are omitted.
[25] This may reflect lower job opportunities in sparsely-populated districts, or may reflect the relative power of overrepresented districts (as MPs in those districts spread their efforts over fewer voters).

Table 1.2: National Sample

Dependent variable: Thousands of dollars awarded to district in electoral period

Specification #	1	2	3	4	5
Unemployment threshold met	2777.59 (376.52)***	2802.16 (423.60)***	2782 (418.12)***	2817.42 (417.07)***	2751.54 (414.05)***
Unemployment above threshold	133.39 (37.30)***	88.56 (40.15)**	100.72 (39.51)**	98.43 (39.37)**	93.07 (39.07)**
Population (thousands)	-25.49 (7.32)***	-17.33 (7.78)**	-15.23 (7.68)**	-15.9 (7.66)**	-16.51 (7.6)**
Legislative session (0=35th parl; 1=36th)	1754.04 (245.19)***	1724.78 (246.02)***	1584.83 (248.09)***	1520.78 (249.41)***	1435.15 (248.73)***
East		1778.37 (475.71)***	1551.79 (471.59)***	1400.3 (482.30)***	1346.29 (479.11)***
West		1136.19 (363.65)***	991.36 (359.87)***	803.85 (418.47)*	626.37 (419.55)
Quebec		1005.98 (366.84)***	829.52 (364.17)**	623.06 (413.33)	510.8 (413.22)
MP contests next election			421.74 (358.95)	478.48 (359.71)	507.87 (357.81)
Margin of victory previous election			-17.19 (7.69)**	-29.33 (12.01)**	-30.83 (13.09)**
Liberal MP				-779.59 (415.48)*	-1188.4 (456.55)***
Liberal MP * Margin				20.68 (15.17)	23.58 (17.35)
MP is member of Cabinet					2166.94 (1055.86)**
Cabinet * Margin					-35.3 (36.3)
Cabinet or Top Shadow Cabinet					-648.32 (811.26)
(Cabinet or Top Shadow) * Margin					15.56 (30.26)
Constant	-718.86 (712)	-2359.56 (834.22)***	-2297.3 (872.74)***	-1711.5 (924.89)*	-1363.41 (926.01)
Pseudo R2	0.0706	0.0748	0.0768	0.0776	0.0794
Prob>chi2	0	0	0	0	0

Tobit specifications, left truncation. N= 595; 386 left censored, 209 uncensored. Asterisks note significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Standard errors in parentheses.

in Eastern Canada benefiting the most. In Specifications 3 through 5, we gradually add political and partisan variables.

We posited three hypothesis concerning the operation of normal politics: MPs contesting the next election will work harder to bring money home; MPs whose re-election is less certain will also work harder; and, MPs with stronger abilities will win more grants. Results are consistent with these hypotheses, though not always

statistically significant. Members of Parliament contesting subsequent elections bring home more money than those leaving politics, though the difference is not statistically significant except in the Quebec subsample. Margin of victory in the previous election proves quite important; every percentage point increase in the representative's margin of victory decreases expected allocations by $17,200. Ability, as proxied by the "Cabinet or top Shadow Cabinet" indicator, *decreases* expected allocations, but the results are not statistically significant without party interactions.[26] While De Figueiredo and Silverman (2001) find that members of Congressional appropriations committees are successful in acquiring larger earmarked allocations, Opposition critics assigned to the HRDC shadow portfolio received insignificantly higher allocations, and members of the HRDC oversight committee did not receive higher allocations than other Members.[27]

Hypothesis Testing: Distributive Politics

The distributive politics literature predicts that districts represented by the governing Liberal Party should receive more money than districts represented by other parties. Evidence that allocations across Liberal districts are relatively more concentrated in narrowly-won districts, when compared to Opposition districts, would point towards the swing-voter hypothesis; contrary evidence would suggest the loyal-voter hypothesis. An advantage for Cabinet Ministers over top members of Shadow Cabinet would also point to partisan influence in grant allocations. Note also that we may see regional differences in whether swing or loyal voter hypotheses are followed.

In the national and most of the regional subsamples analyzed, Liberal districts received significantly *smaller* amounts of money than districts represented by members of other parties. Overall, districts represented by Liberal members could expect to receive $780,000 *less* than other districts during an electoral period. This result is robust to a multitude of specifications, though of course the coefficient varies somewhat across them. Only in Western Canada did the pattern reverse; there,

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[26] Only results in interaction with party variables are here reported; specifications without party interaction are available on request. When a separate indicator for *Cabinet* is not included, the effect of membership among the "cream" of Parliament (top Shadow Cabinet members and Cabinet members) is positive but insignificant. When the *Cabinet* variable is included, the "cream" coefficient becomes negative and insignificant while *Cabinet* is positive and generally strongly significant. These results are discussed in more depth below.

[27] Specifications not here reported; full results available on request. The HRDC Critic could expect $1.3 million more than other Shadow Cabinet members, but the t-statistic is only 1.35. Membership on the HRDC committee correlates with a $176,000 drop in expected funding, but again the t-statistic is only -0.40.

Liberal districts could expect to receive $1,833,000 *more* than other districts.[28] Outside of the West, the main hypothesis that distributive politics rewards districts held by the governing party is rejected.

We do find evidence of a strong advantage for Cabinet members, and especially in comparison with top members of Opposition Shadow Cabinets. Compared to an Opposition backbencher, a Cabinet Minister enjoys a $330,000 advantage in expected funding while a top member of the Shadow Cabinet is at a $648,000 disadvantage. Moreover, funds were directed to shore up the re-election chances of Cabinet Ministers in contestable seats and stymie those of top Shadow Cabinet Members similarly situated. Classifying seats as "contestable" or "safe" using an arbitrarily-chosen five percentage point margin of victory in the previous election yields interesting results, reported in the Appendix as Table 2.4. Normalizing a "safe" Opposition backbench seat to zero, safe Liberal seats lose $790,000; contestable Liberal seats lose $988,000; safe Cabinet seats lose $400,000; contestable Cabinet seats receive $2.6 million. "Safe" backbench Liberals fare better than those winning by narrow margins, while all the stops are pulled to defend contestable seats held by Cabinet Ministers. On the Opposition side of the aisle, and using the same normalization as earlier, contestable Opposition backbench seats receive $958,000; safe seats held by top Shadow Cabinet Members lose $228,000; and, contestable seats held by top Shadow Cabinet Members lose $1.4 million.[29]

Since spending within Liberal districts is relatively more concentrated among strong ridings, the loyal voter hypothesis finds weak support. Removing the variance in allocations common to all parties caused by changes in margin of victory, which we attribute to MP work effort, we find Liberal funding more heavily concentrated among stronger Liberal districts. Outside of the West, as shown in Table 1.3, below, funding for Liberal districts is increasing in margin of victory, as the loyal voter hypothesis predicts. The loyal voter hypothesis does not predict, however, that Liberal districts should receive lower allocations than other districts; consequently support for the loyal voter hypothesis is tenuous. The pattern changes for Cabinet Ministers; funding among districts held by members of cabinet is more heavily concentrated in those districts where Cabinet Ministers faced tougher elections.

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[28] See Table 1.3, below, as well as results found in the Appendix. Coefficient is from Regression 4.W, in the Appendix.

[29] Coefficients on Top Shadow Cabinet variables and on "safe Cabinet seat" statistically insignificant; see Appendix.

Table 1.3 The West And The Rest
Dependent variable: Thousands of dollars awarded to district in electoral period

Specification #	5.West	5.The Rest (Ontario, Quebec, and the East)
Achieving unemployment threshold	-294 (723.31)	3117.58 (453.26)***
Unemployment in excess of threshold	421.2 (105.87)***	122.84 (40.61)***
Population (thousands)	-30.63 (8.82)***	-25.76 (9.20)***
Legislative session (0=35th parl; 1=36th)	492.84 (263.61)*	1757.67 (322.66)***
MP contests next election	-113.88 (331.3)	821.25 (455.64)*
Margin of victory in previous election	11.47 (10.89)	-55.46 (17.9)***
Liberal MP	1325.1 (508.33)***	-2307.54 (571.6)***
Liberal MP * Margin of Victory	-111.27 (49.49)**	62.94 (21.64)***
MP is member of Cabinet	2656.29 (1119.28)**	3163.82 (1344.01)**
Cabinet membership * Margin of Victory	-616.03 (228.48)***	-104.93 (48.44)**
MP is a Cabinet Minister or Top Shadow Cabinet Member	-515.23 (784.66)	-1342.06 (1059.07)
(Cabinet or Top Shadow) * Margin of Victory	-36.63 (30.95)	77.05 (42.77)*
Constant	2909.01 (950.15)***	-240.02 (1139.97)
N	176	419
N (uncensored)	39	170
Pseudo R2	0.0933	0.0826
Prob>chi2	0	0

Tobit specifications, left truncation. Asterisks note significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Standard errors in parentheses.

Outside of Western Canada, we find mixed evidence that outcomes were skewed towards Liberal interests. Liberal districts received less money than other districts in Quebec and in the East,[30] as well as in the broader non-western sample reported in Table 1.3. While Cabinet Ministers consistently receive more money than Liberal backbenchers and than top members of Opposition Shadow Cabinets, they nevertheless receive lower allocations than Opposition backbenchers and minor

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[30] Ontario subsamples could not be analyzed for lack of variance in party representation. See Appendix for other regional subsamples.

shadow cabinet players, the omitted category in Specification 5.[31] Outside of the west, Cabinet Ministers receive $486,000 *less* than Opposition backbenchers but $856,000 *more* than top members of the Shadow Cabinets. Again, however, splitting districts between "safe" and "contestable" seats yields interesting results. Compared to Opposition backbenchers in safe seats, safe Liberal districts received $711,000 less; contestable Liberal districts received $2.5 million less; safe Cabinet seats received $188,000 less; contestable Cabinet seats received $1.85 million more; safe seats held by top Shadow Cabinet Members received $400,000 more; and, contestable seats held by top Members of Shadow Cabinet received $456,000 less during an electoral period.[32]

While Liberal districts fared poorly on the whole, outside of the West, the results suggest that large amounts of funds were channelled to the benefit of threatened Cabinet Ministers, at the expense of other Liberals and prominent Opposition members in contestable districts. The Prime Minister's riding also fared particularly well; regressions including an indicator variable for the district represented by the Prime Minister (regression 5.QC.PM, Appendix) show that the Prime Minister's district received allocations totaling some $5.9 million more than would otherwise have been expected, a result significant at the 5% level.[33] This result is consistent with findings of improprieties in the distribution of grant monies in the Prime Minister's district; however, outliers exist in other parties as well.

Within western Canada, results conform exactly to the prediction of the Shepsle and Weingast strong party model; Liberal districts received far more money than those held by the Canadian Alliance or the NDP. And, where distribution patterns lend weak support to the loyal voter hypothesis in the rest of the country, results from the west conform to the swing voter hypothesis. Table 1.3, above, reports results from the Western Canadian subsample. Compared to Opposition backbenchers, Liberals could expect to receive $1.3 million more in grant allocations;

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[31] To compare Cabinet Ministers to Opposition backbenchers, add the coefficients on Liberal, Cabinet, and (Top Shadow or Cabinet).

[32] Full results available in Table 2.1, in the Appendix. Note that coefficients on "safe cabinet" and top shadow cabinet seats are not statistically significant.

[33] Note, of course, that the Prime Minister's riding never received that much money in either electoral period; the figure represents the marginal increase for having the Prime Minister as M.P. as compared to another Liberal M.P. serving in Cabinet with similar unemployment and other constituency demographics (who would have received a predicted negative allocation). The residual for the Prime Minister's district, totalled over the two periods, sums to $3.4 million greater allocations than expected. However, many ridings have far higher residuals.

Cabinet Ministers could expect an additional $2.1 million over and above the $1.3 million granted other Liberals. Moreover, funds were strongly targeted towards Liberal Members whose continued tenure was in doubt. Anne McLellan's vulnerable Edmonton West district, for example, received large cash infusions through the program, helping to ensure McLellan's re-election while presiding as Justice Minister over the hugely unpopular (in Alberta) firearms registration system.

V. Summary And Conclusion

Standard theories of distributive politics lead us to expect redistribution favoring the majority party in a strong party system. The distribution of grants under the Transitional Jobs Fund and Canada Jobs Fund administered by Human Resources Development Canada in the mid to late 1990s generated a great deal of controversy. Allegations were laid that the fund existed mainly to bolster the re-election prospects of Liberal Members of Parliament, which would have been consistent with the expectations of the distributive politics literature.

Analysis of the data yields several conclusions. First, meeting the stated program unemployment threshold is the most significant factor explaining the distribution of job creation grants. It is the most statistically significant variable and has the largest quantitative effect. Unemployment levels above the threshold level also yield increased grant allocations. Second, normal political variables are important. Representatives elected by slim margins of victory work harder to get grants for their constituents because, as Levitt and Snyder show, increased federal funding produces more votes for local representatives. Similarly, representatives contesting the next election bring home more money than do lame ducks.

Most importantly, however, I find that the strong hypothesis that districts represented by the governing party will fare better than those represented by the opposition is not supported. Overall, Liberal districts fared more poorly than did the districts of other parties. Instead, distributive politics worked in more subtle ways; channelling monies to the districts of vulnerable Cabinet Ministers and shoring up Liberal fortunes in the west, to the expense of Liberals in the rest of the country and, perhaps, of top members of Opposition Shadow Cabinets. Neither the swing voter nor loyal voter hypotheses can be supported wholeheartedly; where distributive politics played out most strongly, evidence supports the swing voter hypothesis. As the loyal voter hypothesis requires higher allocations for districts held by the

governing party, it is rejected; however, it also provides the best description of allocations among Liberal districts outside of the west, barring those held by vulnerable members of Cabinet.

The HRDC job creation grant program provides data for much further study. The effect of grant funding on incumbent reelection performance is an important area for future examination. A broader open question remains: why do we *not* see widespread majoritarian redistribution rather than the piecemeal effects found in this study? While theory led us to expect that Liberal districts would receive larger program allocations than other districts, the broad evidence in this case points us to the opposite conclusion. Why should marginal Liberal backbenchers suffer to help the prospects of Cabinet Ministers when Opposition backbenchers could easily bear the burden? Few observers of the Canadian political scene would agree that the Liberal Party is not a highly effective vote-maximizing organization, its recent leadership quarrels notwithstanding. The reconciliation of vote-maximization with quasi-universalistic patterns of federal spending in a strong party system remains a promising field for future research.

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Data Sources

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http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/reports/3_tjf.shtml

Data on the Canada Jobs Fund was found at:
http://www.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/dept/reports/cjf.pdf

Data on election results was found at:
http://www.elections.ca

Economic data on Canada (including unemployment) was found at:
http://www.statcan.ca

VII. Appendix

Table 2.1 Western Canada Subsample.
Dependent variable: Thousands of dollars awarded to district in electoral period

Specification #	4.W	5.W	9.W
Achieving unemployment threshold	-417.41 (853.7)	-294 (723.31)	-425.25 (815.02)
Unemployment in excess of threshold	**440.23 (122.92)***	**421.2 (105.87)***	**440.31 (118.70)***
Population (thousands)	**-30.53 (10.09)***	**-30.63 (8.82)***	**-32.16 (10.088)***
Legislative session (0=35th parl; 1=36th)	406.66 (302.66)	**492.84 (263.61)***	475.97 (293.76)
MP contests next election	-126.57 (398.22)	-113.88 (331.3)	-60.80 (383.69)
Margin of victory in previous election	2.26 (11.75)	11.47 (10.89)	**-177.04 (63.02)***
Liberal MP	**1833.39 (574.34)***	**1325.1 (508.33)***	
Liberal MP * Margin of Victory	**-183.74 (67.16)***	**-111.27 (49.49)***	
MP is member of Cabinet		**2656.29 (1119.28)***	
Cabinet membership * Margin of Victory		**-616.03 (228.48)***	
MP is Cabinet or Top Shadow Cabinet		-515.23 (784.66)	
(Cabinet or Top Shadow) * Margin of Victory		-36.63 (30.95)	
Canadian Alliance MP			**-1660.46 (552.22)***
(Canadian Alliance) * Margin of Victory			**185.85 (64.30)***
New Democratic Party MP			**-2347.23 (974.08)***
(New Democratic Party) * Margin of Victory			**184.09 (96.77)***
MP is Top Shadow Cabinet member			-424.36 (900.61)
(Top Shadow Cabinet) * Margin of Victory			-40.12 (34.88)
Constant	**2874.6 (1100.94)***	**2909.01 (950.15)***	**4777.00 (1272.44)***
Pseudo R2	0.068	0.0933	0.0825
Prob>chi2	0	0	0

Tobit specifications, left truncation. N = 176; 137 left censored, 39 uncensored.
Asterisks note significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Standard errors in
parentheses.

Table 2.2 Quebec Subsample.

Dependent variable: Thousands of dollars awarded to district in electoral period

Specification #	4.QC	5.QC	5.QC.PM	9. QC
Achieving unemployment threshold	**2244.49** **(798.07)*****	**2227.74** **(810.07)*****	**2305.66** **(792.82)*****	**2306.35** **(826.02)*****
Unemployment in excess of threshold	**152.77** **(91.35)***	146.07 (92.45)	135.69 (90.28)	142.15 -92.78
Population (thousands)	-2.15 (18.5)	-3.69 (18.6)	2.95 (18.38)	-5.17 (18.55)
Legislative session (0=35th parl; 1=36th)	**1505.81** **(495.97)*****	**1527.42** **(495.81)*****	**1554.47** **(487.42)*****	**1549.28** **(499.74)*****
MP contests next election	**1648.51** **(670.08)****	**1527.13** **(672.41)****	**1450.63** **(656.59)****	**1559.14** **(673.27)****
Margin of victory in previous election	-34.35 (21.18)	**-44.08** **(22.76)***	**-42.57** **(22.19)***	-11.93 (18.81)
Liberal MP	-806.95 (809.83)	-909.49 (888.39)	-896.8 (866.08)	
Liberal MP * Margin of Victory	23.14 (27.65)	22.21 (32.4)	19.45 (31.58)	
MP is member of Cabinet		1067.72 (2033.82)	-2509.23 (2473.01)	
Cabinet membership * Margin of Victory		-39.2 (65.58)	37.46 (71.02)	
MP is Cabinet or Top Shadow Cabinet		-797.49 (1339.35)	-846.66 (1307.25)	
(Cabinet or Top Shadow) * Margin of Victory		55.68 (51)	55.93 (49.77)	
Prime Minister's Riding			**5940.69** **(2329.1)****	
Bloc Quebecois MP				995.41 (838.89)
(Bloc Quebecois) * Margin of Victory				-34.83 (29.22)
Progressive Conservative Party MP				-386.97 (2050.29)
(Progressive Conservative) * Margin of Victory				73.31 (228.17)
MP is Top Shadow Cabinet member				-711.58 (1372.77)
(Top Shadow Cabinet) * Margin of Victory				52.14 (51.86)
Constant	-3030.91 (2080.09)	-2666.09 (2097.94)	-3261.9 (2073.22)	-3511.56 (2145.10)
Pseudo R2	0.0251	0.0268	0.0306	0.0264
Prob>chi2	0	0	0	0

Tobit specifications, left truncation. N = 149; 60 left censored, 89 uncensored.
Asterisks note significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.3 Eastern Canadian Subsample.

Dependent variable: Thousands of dollars awarded to district in electoral period

Specification #	4.E	5.E	9.E
Achieving unemployment threshold	**2839.88** **(930.93)***	**3187.16** **(985.51)***	**2703.80** **(987.43)***
Unemployment in excess of threshold	**108.53** **(51.13)**	**98.7** **(50.5)***	69.68 (46.56)
Population (thousands)	12.93 (12.28)	12.1 (12.74)	10.00 (10.91)
Legislative session (0=35th parl; 1=36th)	**2316.6** **(742.88)***	**1959.18** **(830.54)**	**2547.62** **(656.02)***
MP contests next election	-608.84 (766.72)	-400.54 (799.88)	-598.06 (670.19)
Margin of victory in previous election	1.33 (35.12)	-5.28 (36.74)	-4.35 (16.30)
Liberal MP	-935.18 (843.15)	**-1793.98** **(959.23)***	
Liberal MP * Margin of Victory	-12.3 (40.71)	2.91 (42.39)	
MP is member of Cabinet		**4859.99** **(2302.31)**	
Cabinet membership * Margin of Victory		-171.43 (120.74)	
MP is Cabinet or Top Shadow Cabinet		-3163.28 (2019.04)	
(Cabinet or Top Shadow) * Margin of Victory		127.75 (115.59)	
New Democratic Party MP			-355.59 (1035.09)
(New Democrat) * Margin of Victory			**221.12** **(69.14)***
Progressive Conservative Party MP			**1945.64** **(904.63)**
(Progressive Conservative) * Margin of Victory			-62.60 (44.68)
MP is Top Shadow Cabinet member			-1209.08 (1972.04)
(Top Shadow Cabinet) * Margin of Victory			-80.65 (119.60)
Constant	-1896.97 (1947.23)	-1638.91 (2131.87)	-2432.15 (1481.92)
Pseudo R2	0.0487	0.0534	0.0628
Prob>chi2	0	0	0

Tobit specifications, left truncation. N = 64; 6 left censored, 58 uncensored.
Asterisks note significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.4: Safe and Contestable Seats

Dependent variable: Thousands of dollars awarded to district in electoral period

	National Sample	Ontario, Quebec and East
Achieving unemployment threshold	**2755.38** **(370.01)***	**3168.54** **(452.64)***
Unemployment in excess of threshold	**128.15** **(36.14)***	**138.51** **(40.87)***
Population (thousands)	**-22.93** **(7.20)***	**-22.87** **(9.16)***
Legislative session (0=35th parl; 1=36th)	**1526.48** **(240.46)***	**1949.80** **(300.03)***
MP contests next election	574.41 (361.42)	**905.01** **(457.19)**
Contestable Seat	**958.17** **(480.90)**	**1553.55** **(655.44)**
Safe Liberal Seat	**-790.92** **(276.02)***	**-711.27** **(342.89)**
Contestable Liberal Seat	**-1945.70** **(720.34)***	**-4006.33** **(1051.45)***
Safe Cabinet Seat	391.40 (414.20)	523.20 (454.50)
Contestable Cabinet Seat	**3562.18** **(1012.66)***	**4306.55** **(1357.93)***
Safe Top Shadow Cabinet Seat	-227.95 (422.89)	399.79 (532.54)
Contestable Top Shadow Cabinet Seat	-2351.22 (1717.65)	-2009.81 (2203.83)
Constant	-986.79 (781.74)	-1997.51 (1090.12)*
Pseudo R2	0.0776	0.0822
Prob>chi2	0	0

Tobit specifications, left truncation. N = 596; 386 left censored, 210 uncensored in the National sample; N = 420, 249 left censored, 171 uncensored in the subsample. Asterisks note significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% levels. Standard errors in parentheses.