This page contains the written transcript from a National Public Radio Broadcast about an escalation in the US military involvement in Vietnam. The parallels with the recent invasion of Iraq are uncanny. You might enjoy trying to understand/interpret the decision to go to war in light of our introductory game theory course (the etxt has a simple military game called the battle of the bismarck sea, p117 - of course strategic interaction in real wars is complex, and complicated...but how would you try to descibe the structure of the war game reported on here??

MELISSA BLOCK, host:
This is ALL THINGS CONSIDERED from NPR News. I'm Melissa Block.
A story now from history about a president, war and shaky military
information. Forty years ago this week, a murky incident at sea plunged the
United States deeper into the war in Vietnam. The naval encounter off the
Vietnamese coast spurred Congress to past the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. It
gave President Lyndon Johnson power to use force in Southeast Asia. US
involvement in the Vietnam War became legitimized and grew. In 1964,
commentator and former TV anchor Walter Cronkite knew only what official
reports acknowledged. Four decades later, he tells the story with new
perspective.

here is the AUDIO FILE to listen to (internal to campus) ; a written transcript follows below....

We have the publisher's authorization to post this on our course website click here

Display Timing: 00:12:30

Segment Number: 6

Series: ALL THINGS CONSIDERED

Trans. Title: PROFILE: REMEMBERING THE GULF OF TONKIN INCIDENT 40 YEARS
LATER

Cat. Title: TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION 40TH ANNIVERSARY, PART 1 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
----

WALTER CRONKITE:
By the summer of 1964, the Johnson administration has made itself the
reluctant patron of a South Vietnamese military it could neither control nor
abandon. The White House was growing impatient with military strikes coming
from Communist North Vietnam. Lyndon Johnson was eager to end what were
called `the privileged sanctuaries.' Many agreed with him, if it could be
done carefully without drawing the Chinese or Soviets into the war. In
August 1964, America was also in the middle of a presidential election.
Civil rights and Russia were the major issues. Vietnam simmered quietly in
the background, still too remote to seem urgent, but too American too
ignore. Campus anti-war fervor was barely stirring. Students and professors
protested in sedate teach-ins; few paid attention.
But if the left was asleep, the right was on the march. The Republicans had
just nominated Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater for president. Goldwater was
a fervent hawk who believed that nuclear weapons could help bring victory in
Vietnam. If that sounds extreme today, it sounded extreme then, too. But he
said it.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 BROADCAST
Senator BARRY GOLDWATER (Republican, Arizona): Defoliation of the forest by
low-yield atomic weapons could well be done. And when you remove the
foliage, you remove the cover.
CRONKITE: By default, Lyndon Johnson represented peace through firm but
cautious moderation. His moderation would soon be tested.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 NEWSCAST
Unidentified Man: ...Washington, North Vietnamese torpedo boats opened an
attack in the Gulf of Tonkin today. The first reports were confused. The
reports lacked official confirmation...
CRONKITE: On Sunday, August 2nd, three North Vietnamese torpedo boats
attacked the Maddox, an American destroyer at sea in the Gulf of Tonkin. The
Maddox was on an intelligence mission about 25 miles from the North Vietnam
coast. Two of the attacking boats were damaged, a third sunk. It was 3:30
Sunday morning in Washington. The president was not awakened.
By 10:30 Monday morning, Johnson was on the phone to Defense Secretary
Robert McNamara in Newport, Rhode Island. Subject: What to tell Congress.
That conversation and many others were recorded by the White House.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
President LYNDON JOHNSON: Now I wonder if you don't think it'd be wise for
you and Rusk to get back the speaker and Mansfield to call a group of 15 to
20 people together from the Armed Services and Foreign Relations, tell them
what happened. A good many of them are saying to me...
Secretary ROBERT McNAMARA (Department of Defense): Right. I've been thinking
about this myself, and I thought that...
Pres. JOHNSON: They're going to start an investigation if you don't.
Sec. McNAMARA: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
Pres. JOHNSON: And you got Dirksen up there...
Sec. McNAMARA: Yeah.
Pres. JOHNSON: ...and he's saying you got to study it further. Say to
Mansfield, `Now the president wants us to--you to get the proper people,'
and we come in and you say, `They fired at us, we responded immediately and
we took out one of their boats and put the other two running. And we kept
our--we're putting our boats right there and we're not running
(unintelligible).'
Sec. McNAMARA: ...(Unintelligible) guard and destroy.
Pres. JOHNSON: That's right.
Sec. McNAMARA: Right. And I think I should also, or we should also, at that
time, Mr. President, explain this Oplan 34A, these covert operations.
CRONKITE: Plan 34A was the code name for a strategy of covert strikes in the
North. It was supported by the CIA, but it was fronted by South Vietnamese
to insulate the American role. No congressman or journalist knew about 34A,
but as McNamara tells the president here, it was probably a 34A strike on
Friday that provoked the attack on the Maddox.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Sec. McNAMARA: There is no question about what that had bearing on it. And
Friday night, as you probably know, we had four TP boats from Vietnam,
manned by Vietnamese or other nationals, attack two islands. And following
24 hours after that with this destroyer in that same area undoubtedly led
them to connect the two of them.
Pres. JOHNSON: Well, say that to Dirksen.
Sec. McNAMARA: That's what I thought I'd do, yeah.
Pres. JOHNSON: And if you notice Dirksen says this morning that we got to
reassess our situation...
Sec. McNAMARA: Right. Right.
Pres. JOHNSON: ...do something about it, and I'd tell him that we're doing
what he's talking about.
CRONKITE: McNamara thought it was time to tell Congress about 34A, but
Johnson still hesitated. He feared that American provocations could make him
seem hawkish. He preferred to appear firm and restrained in sharp contrast
to Goldwater.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Pres. JOHNSON: We ought to say I want to leave an impression that we're
going to be firm as hell without saying something that's dangerous. Now what
do you think of--the people that are calling me up, they all...
Sec. McNAMARA: They will.
Pres. JOHNSON: The Navy responded wonderfully, and that's good. But they
want to be damn sure I don't pull them out and run, and they want to be damn
sure that we're firm. That's what all the country wants, because Goldwater's
raising so much hell about how he's going to blow them off the moon. And
they say that we oughtn't to do anything that national interest doesn't
require. But we sure ought to always leave the impression that if you shoot
at us, you're going to get hit.
CRONKITE: The first incident passed quietly that Sunday. The morning papers
treated it as a routine war story. Meanwhile, in the Gulf of Tonkin, a
second destroyer, the Turner Joy, was dispatched to join the Maddox.
Together, they moved within 11 miles of the North Vietnam coast. The ships
were being deliberately positioned to draw a second attack. Tuesday morning,
McNamara told the president what to expect and what options an attack would
give him.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Sec. McNAMARA: We just received a cable from Admiral Sharpe making three
recommendations with respect to our destroyer tracks and enemy action
responses. And Sharpe recommends first that the track of the destroyer be
shifted from 11 miles offshore to eight miles off shore. This makes no sense
to us; we would recommend against it.
Pres. JOHNSON: Why? What other objections do you have?
Sec. McNAMARA: It changes a program that shouldn't be changed frequently.
This ship is allegedly to be attacked tonight. We don't...
CRONKITE: He didn't say `could be attacked' or `might be attacked.' He said
`to be attacked tonight.' Washington was clearly laying bait for the fox;
American bait to justify American retaliation.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Sec. McNAMARA: I personally would recommend to you, after a second attack on
our ships, that we do retaliate against the coast of North Vietnam some way
or other.
Pres. JOHNSON: But when they move on us and they shoot at us, I think we not
only ought to shoot at them, but almost simultaneously pull one of these
things that you've been doing...
Sec. McNAMARA: Right.
Pres. JOHNSON: ...on one of their bridges or something.
Sec. McNAMARA: Exactly. I quite agree with you, Mr. President. We will have
have that, a retaliation move against North Vietnam, in the event this
attack takes place within the next six to nine hours.
Pres. JOHNSON: And I want to keep this as close as I can, so let's just try
to keep it to the two of us.
Sec. McNAMARA: All right. I will be prepared...
CRONKITE: They would not have to wait six to nine hours. Within 90 minutes,
the game was on.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Unidentified Woman: Secretary McNamara calling, line O.
Sec. McNAMARA: Mr. President, we just had word by telephone from Admiral
Sharpe that the destroyer is under torpedo attack.
Pres. JOHNSON: Now where are these torpedoes coming from?
Sec. McNAMARA: Well, we don't know, presumably from these unidentified craft
that I mentioned to you a moment ago.
CRONKITE: The president asked a good question. The fact was no one knew
where the torpedoes were coming from because no one was certain that there
actually were any torpedoes. Sonar contacts were inconclusive. They could
have meant an enemy ship. They also could have meant an incontinent whale.
Upon what was now a foregone conclusion rested peace or war.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Pres. JOHNSON: What are these planes of ours doing around while they're
being attacked?
Sec. McNAMARA: Well, presumably, the planes are attacking the ships. We
don't have any word from Sharpe on that. The planes would be...
CRONKITE: Perhaps in the brief exchange lay the misunderstanding that became
the tipping point for the entire Vietnam War. From it would follow the
events that would send America into battle for the next nine years. Late
that afternoon in New York, my colleagues and I were in our final
preparations for the "CBS Evening News." We didn't know about a second
attack until around 5 PM, when the wire services began reporting the first
presumed details. If we were surprised, though, the White House was
dismayed. Again, McNamara and Johnson.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Sec. McNAMARA: Mr. President, the story has broken on the AP and the UP.
Pres. JOHNSON: Yeah, I see it.
Sec. McNAMARA: And we've tried to track it down. General Greenfield talked
to the AP, I understand, and was told it came from a source close to the
Pentagon. I don't know what the source it, but anyhow, it's broken. And it
seems to me State and we and George Reedy ought to agree now on a statement
that could be made by one of the departments. I presume...
CRONKITE: By early evening, with the facts still murky and uncertain,
Johnson made his final decision: an American force would strike North
Vietnam at 10 PM. The president would make an announcement while the planes
were in the air. In drafting his statement, Johnson seemed to have one eye
on Vietnam and the other on Arizona. Barry Goldwater now presented an
awkward dilemma. Would the senator's support undercut Johnson's moderate
standing?
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 RECORDING
Pres. JOHNSON: What do you think about--I don't see why we bring Goldwater
in on this. I think it makes us sound like we're very much together and
buddies and agreeing on bombing everybody.
Sec. McNAMARA: Well, in that case, I'd leave out the paragraph. You've
talked up above about the leaders of both parties, and it seems to me that's
the strong point.
Pres. JOHNSON: Yeah. But the trouble is he's going to be calling in about
9:30.
Sec. McNAMARA: Well, I'd keep talking to him--trying to talk to him, all
right, but I'd try to talk to him before I made it, but I wouldn't refer to
having talked to him. Of course, you don't have to tie him into your
statement.
CRONKITE: Forty-five minutes before launch, the two men considered the
timing of the announcement.
Pres. JOHNSON: Now when they leave the carrier at 10, how long does it take
them to get over the target?
Sec. McNAMARA: The pass time over the target will be two hours from then, we
believe.
Pres. JOHNSON: You better check that, Bob.
Sec. McNAMARA: I did. I just talked to Admiral Sharpe about it. They'll get
the statement simultaneously, but they won't know what targets are being
attacked.
Pres. JOHNSON: Well, it looks like, in fact, that they ...(unintelligible)
where those boats are coming from. And I'd sure as hell hate to have some
mother say, `You announced it, and my boy got killed.'
Sec. McNAMARA: The first were not to be over the target within an hour after
launch, but the radar of the North Vietnamese should pick up the first
aircraft a few minutes after launch.
Pres. JOHNSON: So that would be all right then.
Sec. McNAMARA: Oh, I would think so then. If you did it at 10:30, you could
make the 11:00 news.
SOUNDBITE OF 1964 BROADCAST
Pres. JOHNSON: It is my duty to the American people to report that renewed
hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of
Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United
States to take action in reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you
tonight.
CRONKITE: His statement lifted a minor encounter to the level of a war
crisis. The next morning, The New York Times treated the story in a 48.8
column headline. The president emphasized that retaliation was limited and
proportional; `fitting,' he called it. One pilot was killed, another
captured over an incident that likely never happened in a decision based on
what even then was suspect intelligence. Lyndon Johnson effectively ended
the American role as adviser in South Vietnam and made it America's war.
BLOCK: Walter Cronkite continues the story of the Tonkin Gulf Resolution
next on ALL THINGS CONSIDERED.

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Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2004 08:55:34 -0400
From: Worldwide1 <worldwide1@npr.org>
Subject: RE: NPR Cronkite feature
To: 'John Fountain' <john.fountain@canterbury.ac.nz>
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Dear Mr. Fountain,
You have our permission to use the material as described.
NPR Worldwide
Washintgon
Here is a transcript for your use:
Transcript
Show Date: 2004-08-02

-----Original Message-----
From: John Fountain [mailto:john.fountain@canterbury.ac.nz]
Sent: Saturday, August 07, 2004 5:25 AM
To: worldwide@npr.org
Subject: i recently listened to an npr program by walter conkrite
http://www.npr.org/features/feature.php?wfId=3810724
i would like your permission to make tis available to the students in
my second year class in game theory at the university of cantebrury
unfortunatley our telecoms system charges students for access (10
cnets a mb) so that i would like to place the file on our streaming
server -avaianble only internally within the university
please check out the couse under econ 223 in the teaching section of
my home page below
thanks
john

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