Bibliography and Notes

0 - 500AD
The Talmud results are from Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler, (1985), Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, Journal of Economic Theory 36, 195-213.
1713
1838
Cournot, Augustin A. (1838), Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiquesde la Theorie des Richesses. Paris: Hachette. (English translation: Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. New York: Macmillan, 1897. (Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1971)).
1871
Darwin, C. (1871), The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: John Murray. This theory of the evolution of the sex ratio is normally attributed to R. A. Fisher (The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). Before presenting the theory Fisher quotes a paragraph from the second (1874) edition of Darwin's Descent of Man in which Darwin cannot see how a 1:1 sex ratio could be the result of natural section. Fisher appears not to have noticed that the paragraph he quotes comes from a section which replaces the section in the first edition which contains the essence of Fisher's own theory. The fact that Darwin had anticipated Fisher by some 60 years was first noted by Michael Bulmer in his 1994 book, Theoretical Evolutionary Ecology. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Publishers. See chapter 10, pages 207 - 208. This fact is also discussed in an unpublished paper by Martin Osborne; Darwin, Fisher, and a Theory of the Evolution of the Sex Ratio. See martin j. osborne's recent research
1881
Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro (1881), Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. London: Kegan Paul. (Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967).
1913
Zermelo, E. (1913), Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, pp. 501-504 in Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, Volume II (E. W. Hobson and A. E. H. Love, eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The reference for the Konig paper is Konig, Denes (1927), Uber eine Schlussweise aus dem Endlichen ins Unendliche, Acta Sci. Math. Szeged 3, 121-130 while the Kalmar reference is Kalmar, Laszlo (1928/29), Zur Theorie der abstrakten Spiele, Acta Sci. Math. Szeged 4, 65-85. The English translation of Zermelo's paper and discussion of all three papers is in Schwalbe, U. and P. Walker (2001), Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory, Games and Economic Behavior v34 no1, 123-37.
1921-27
This follows Dimand, Robert W. and Mary Ann Dimand (1992), The Early History of the Theory of Games from Waldegrave to Borel, pp. 15-27 in Toward a History of Game Theory (Annual Supplement to Volume 24 History of Political Economy) (E. Roy Weintraub ed.), Durham: Duke University Press. Frechet, Maurice (1953), Emile Borel, Initiator of the Theory of Psychological games and its Application, Econometrica 21, 95-96, credits Borel with seven notes on game theory between 1921 and 1927. The Frechet seven are: (1) La theorie du jeu et les equations integrales a noyan symetrique gauche, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 173, 1921, pp. 1304-1308. (2) Sur les jeux ou interviennent l'hasard et l'habilete des joueurs, Association Francaise pour l'Advancement des Sciences, 1923, pp. 79-85. (3) Sur les jeux ou interviennent l'hasard et l'habilete des joueurs, Theorie des Probabilites. Paris: Librairie Scientifique, J. Hermann, (1924), pp. 204-224. (4) Un theoreme sur les systemes de formes lineaires a determinant symetrique gauche, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 183, 1926, pp. 925-927, avec erratum, p. 996 . (5) Algebre et calcul des probabilites, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 184, 1927, pp. 52-53. (6) Traite du calcul des probabilites et de ses applications, Applications des jeux de hasard. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, Vol. IV, 1938, Fascicule 2, 122 pp. (7) Jeux ou la psychologie joue un role fondamental, see (6) pp. 71-87. Dimand and Dimand note that (6) and (7) are dated 1938 and so are outside the 1921-1927 time frame while article (2) has the same title as the chapter from the book (3). Three of Borel's notes were translated and published in Econometrica 21(1953). (1) was published as Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels, pp. 91-100. (3) was published as On Games that involve Chance and the Skill of the Players, pp. 101-115. (5) was published as On Systems of Linear Forms of Skew Symmetric Determinant and the General Theory of Play, pp. 116-117.
1928
von Neumann, J. (1928), Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische Annalen 100, 295-320. (Translated as "On the Theory of Games of Strategy", pp.13-42 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959).
1930
Zeuthen, F. (1930), Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. London: George Routledge and Sons. The mathematical equivalence of Zeuthen's and Nash's solutions was shown by Harsanyi, J. C. (1956), Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories, Econometrica 24, 144-157.
1934
Fisher, R. A. (1934), Randomisation, and an Old Enigma of Card Play, Mathematical Gazette 18, 294-297.
1938
Ville, Jean (1938), Note sur la theorie generale des jeux ou intervient l'habilite des jouers, pp. 105-113 in Applications aux jeux de hasard, Tome IV, Fascicule II of Traite du calcul des probabilities et de ses applications (Emile Borel), Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
1944
von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1945
Simon, H. A. (1945), Review of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, American Journal of Sociology 27, 558-560.
1946
Loomis, L. H. (1946), On a Theorem of von Neumann, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 32, 213-215.
1950
Kuhn, H. W. and A. W. Tucker, eds. (1950), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume I (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 24). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1950
Publication of Tucker's (1950) memo occurred in 1980 under the title On Jargon: The Prisoner's Dilemma, UMAP Journal 1, 101.
1950
McDonald, John (1950), Strategy in Poker, Business and War. New York: Norton. This book based on two articles McDonald wrote for Fortune magazine. The first, Poker, An American Game (March, 1948) and the second, A Theory of Strategy (June, 1949).
1950-1953
Nash, J. F. (1950), Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36, 48-49.
Nash, J. F. (1951), Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54, 286-295.
Nash, J. F. (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18, 155-162.
Nash, J. F. (1953), Two Person Cooperative Games, Econometrica 21, 128-140.
1950-1953
Kuhn, H. W. (1950), Extensive Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36, 570576.
Kuhn, H. W. (1953), Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, pp. 193-216 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28) (H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1951
Brown, G. W. (1951), Iterative Solution of Games by Fictitious Play, pp. 374-376 in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation (T. C. Koopmans, ed.), New York: Wiley.
1952
McKinsey, John Charles C. (1952), Introduction to the Theory of Games. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
1952
Flood's 1952 Rand memorandum was published in Flood, M. A. (1958), Some Experimental Games, Management Science 5, 5-26.
1952
Some of the experimental papers from the conference appear in Thrall, R. M., C. H. Coombs and R. C. Davis, eds. (1954), Decision Processes. New York: Wiley.
1952-53
Gillies published version of the core concept appears in his paper, Gillies, D. B. (1959), Solutions to General Non-Zero-Sum Games, pp. 47-85 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1953
Shapley, L. S. (1953), A Value for n-Person Games, pp. 307-317 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28) (H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1953
Shapley, L. S. (1953), Stochastic Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 39, 1095-1100.
1953
Kuhn, H. W. and A. W. Tucker, eds. (1953), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1954
Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1954), A Method for Evaluating The Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48, 787-792.
1955
Braithwaite, R. B. (1955), Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1957
Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957), Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York: Wiley. (Reprinted New York: Dover, 1989).
1957
Dresher, Melvin, A. W. Tucker and P. Wolfe, eds. (1957), Contributions to theTheory of Games, Volume III (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 39). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959
Aumann, R. J. (1959), Acceptable Points in General Cooperative N-Person Games, pp. 287-324 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959
Shubik, M. (1959), Edgeworth Market Games, pp. 267-278 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959
Tucker, A. W. and R. D. Luce, eds. (1959), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959
Shubik, M. (1959), Strategy and Market Structure: Competition, Oligopoly, and the Theory of Games. New York: Wiley.
1960
Aumann, R. J. and B. Peleg (1960), Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 66, 173-179.
1960
Schelling, T. C. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1961
Lewontin, R. C. (1961), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Journal of Theoretical Biology 1, 382-403.
1961
Aumann, R. J. (1961), The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98, 539-552.
1962
Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962), College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, American Mathematics Monthly 69, 9-15.
1962
Shubik, M. (1962), Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing, Management Science 8, 325-343.
1962
Borch, Karl (1962), Application of Game Theory to Some Problems in Automobile Insurance, The Astin Bulletin 2 (part 2), 208-221.
1963
Debreu, G. and H. Scarf (1963), A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy, International Economic Review 4, 235-246.
1964
Aumann, R. J. (1964), Markets with a Continuum of Traders, Econometrica 32, 39-50.
1964
Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler (1964), The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games, pp. 443-476 in Advances in Game Theory (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 52) (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1964
Lemke, Carlton E. and J. T. Howson, Jr. (1964), Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Journal of Applied Mathematics 12, 413-423.
1965
Isaacs, Rufus (1965), Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization. New York: Wiley.
1965
Selten, R. (1965), Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit, Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 301-324 and 667-689.
1965
Davis, M. and M. Maschler (1965), The Kernel of a Cooperative Game, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 223-259.
1966
Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler (1966), Game-Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament, Chapter V in Report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ST-80. Princeton: Mathematica.
1966
Harsanyi, J. C. (1966), A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations, Econometrica 34, 613-634.
1967
Shapley, L. S. (1967), On Balanced Sets and Cores, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14, 453-460.
1967
Scarf, H. E. (1967), The Core of a N-Person Game, Econometrica 35, 50-69.
1967-68
Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-8), Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Parts I, II and III, Management Science 14, 159-182, 320-334 and 486-502.
1968
Lucas, W. F. (1968), A Game with No Solution, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 74, 237-239.
1969
Schmeidler, D. (1969), The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Journal of Applied Mathematics 17, 1163-1170.
1969
Shapley, L. S. (1969), Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games, pp. 251-263 in La Decision, Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. (Reprinted on pp. 307-319 of The Shapley Value (Alvin E. Roth, ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
1969
Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1969), On Market Games, Journal of Economic Theory 1, 9-25.
1972
Maynard Smith, John (1972), Game Theory and the Evolution of Fighting, pp.8-28 in On Evolution (John Maynard Smith), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
1973
Harsanyi, J. C. (1973), Games with Randomly Distured Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points, International Journal of Game Theory 2, 1-23.
1973
Maynard Smith, John and G. A. Price (1973), The Logic of Animal Conflict, Nature 246, 15-18.
1973
Gibbard, A. (1973), Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica 41, 587-601.
1974
Aumann, R. J. and L. S. Shapley (1974), Values of Non-Atomic Games. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1974
Aumann, R. J. (1974), Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67-96.
1975
Selten, R. (1975), Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games, International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25-55.
1975
Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975), Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 43, 513-518.
1975
Faulhaber, G. (1975), Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, American Economic Review 65, 966-977.
1976
Lewis, D. K. (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1976
Aumann, R. J. (1976), Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of Statistics 4, 1236-1239.
1977
Littlechild, S. C. and G. F. Thompson (1977), Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach, Bell Journal of Economics 8, 186-204.
1981
Kohlberg, Elon (1981), Some Problems with the Concept of Perfect Equilibria, Rapporteurs' Report of the NBER Conference on the Theory of General Economic Equilibrium by Karl Dunz and Nirvikar Sing, University of Californa Berkeley.
1981
Aumann, R. J. (1981), Survey of Repeated Games, pp.11-42 in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern (R. J. Aumann et al), Zurich: Bibliographisches Institut. (This paper is a slightly revised and updated version of a paper originally presented as background material for a one-day workshop on repeated games that took place at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (Stanford University) summer seminar on mathematical economics on 10 August 1978.) (A slightly revised and updated version of the 1981 version is reprinted as Repeated Games on pp. 209-242 of Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare (George R Feiwel, ed.), London: Macmillan.)
1982
Kreps, D. M. and R. B. Wison (1982), Sequential Equilibria, Econometrica 50, 863-894.
1982
Rubinstein, A. (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50, 97-109.
1982
Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1984
Roth, A. E. (1984), The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, Journal of Political Economy 92, 991-1016.
1984
Bernheim, B. D. (1984), Rationalizable Strategic Behavior, Econometrica 52, 1007-1028.
1984
Pearce, D. G. (1984), Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection, Econometrica 52, 1029-1050.
1984
Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
1985
Mertens, J.-F. and S. Zamir (1985), Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information, International Journal of Games Theory 14, 1-29.
1985-86
Neyman, A. (1985), Bounded Complexity Jusifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Economic Letters 19, 227-229.
1985-86
Rubinstein, A. (1986), Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39, 83-96.
1986
Kohlberg, E. and J.-F. Mertens (1986), On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Econometrica 54, 1003-1037.
1988
Harsanyi, J. C. and R. Selten (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
1988
Tan, T. and S. Werlang (1988), The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games, Journal of Economic Theory 45, 370-391.
1990
Kreps, D. M. (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1990
Crawford, V. P. (1990), Equilibrium without Independence, Journal of Economic Theory 50,127-154.
1991
Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory 53, 236-260.
1992
Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, eds. (1992), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1994
Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker (1994), Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1994
Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, eds. (1994), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
2002
Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, eds. (2002), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland.