Chronology of Game Theory Bibliography

Bibliography and Notes

0 - 500AD: The Talmud results are from Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler, (1985), Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud, Journal of Economic Theory 36, 195-213.
1713
1838: Cournot, Augustin A. (1838), Recherches sur les Principes Mathematiquesde la Theorie des Richesses. Paris: Hachette. (English translation: Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth. New York: Macmillan, 1897. (Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1971)).
1871: Darwin, C. (1871), The Descent of Man, and Selection in Relation to Sex. London: John Murray. This theory of the evolution of the sex ratio is normally attributed to R. A. Fisher (The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). Before presenting the theory Fisher quotes a paragraph from the second (1874) edition of Darwin's Descent of Man in which Darwin cannot see how a 1:1 sex ratio could be the result of natural section. Fisher appears not to have noticed that the paragraph he quotes comes from a section which replaces the section in the first edition which contains the essence of Fisher's own theory. The fact that Darwin had anticipated Fisher by some 60 years was first noted by Michael Bulmer in his 1994 book, Theoretical Evolutionary Ecology. Sunderland, MA: Sinauer Associates Publishers. See chapter 10, pages 207 - 208. This fact is also discussed in an unpublished paper by Martin Osborne; Darwin, Fisher, and a Theory of the Evolution of the Sex Ratio. See martin j. osborne's recent research
1881: Edgeworth, Francis Ysidro (1881), Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences. London: Kegan Paul. (Reprinted New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1967).
1913: Zermelo, E. (1913), Uber eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie des Schachspiels, pp. 501-504 in Proceedings of the Fifth International Congress of Mathematicians, Volume II (E. W. Hobson and A. E. H. Love, eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The reference for the Konig paper is Konig, Denes (1927), Uber eine Schlussweise aus dem Endlichen ins Unendliche, Acta Sci. Math. Szeged 3, 121-130 while the Kalmar reference is Kalmar, Laszlo (1928/29), Zur Theorie der abstrakten Spiele, Acta Sci. Math. Szeged 4, 65-85. The English translation of Zermelo's paper and discussion of all three papers is in Schwalbe, U. and P. Walker (2001), Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory, Games and Economic Behavior v34 no1, 123-37.
1921-27: This follows Dimand, Robert W. and Mary Ann Dimand (1992), The Early History of the Theory of Games from Waldegrave to Borel, pp. 15-27 in Toward a History of Game Theory (Annual Supplement to Volume 24 History of Political Economy) (E. Roy Weintraub ed.), Durham: Duke University Press. Frechet, Maurice (1953), Emile Borel, Initiator of the Theory of Psychological games and its Application, Econometrica 21, 95-96, credits Borel with seven notes on game theory between 1921 and 1927. The Frechet seven are: (1) La theorie du jeu et les equations integrales a noyan symetrique gauche, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 173, 1921, pp. 1304-1308. (2) Sur les jeux ou interviennent l'hasard et l'habilete des joueurs, Association Francaise pour l'Advancement des Sciences, 1923, pp. 79-85. (3) Sur les jeux ou interviennent l'hasard et l'habilete des joueurs, Theorie des Probabilites. Paris: Librairie Scientifique, J. Hermann, (1924), pp. 204-224. (4) Un theoreme sur les systemes de formes lineaires a determinant symetrique gauche, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 183, 1926, pp. 925-927, avec erratum, p. 996 . (5) Algebre et calcul des probabilites, Comptes Rendus Academie des Sciences, Vol. 184, 1927, pp. 52-53. (6) Traite du calcul des probabilites et de ses applications, Applications des jeux de hasard. Paris: Gauthier-Villars, Vol. IV, 1938, Fascicule 2, 122 pp. (7) Jeux ou la psychologie joue un role fondamental, see (6) pp. 71-87. Dimand and Dimand note that (6) and (7) are dated 1938 and so are outside the 1921-1927 time frame while article (2) has the same title as the chapter from the book (3). Three of Borel's notes were translated and published in Econometrica 21(1953). (1) was published as Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels, pp. 91-100. (3) was published as On Games that involve Chance and the Skill of the Players, pp. 101-115. (5) was published as On Systems of Linear Forms of Skew Symmetric Determinant and the General Theory of Play, pp. 116-117.
1928: von Neumann, J. (1928), Zur Theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Mathematische Annalen 100, 295-320. (Translated as "On the Theory of Games of Strategy", pp.13-42 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1959).
1930: Zeuthen, F. (1930), Problems of Monopoly and Economic Warfare. London: George Routledge and Sons. The mathematical equivalence of Zeuthen's and Nash's solutions was shown by Harsanyi, J. C. (1956), Approaches to the Bargaining Problem Before and After the Theory of Games: A Critical Discussion of Zeuthen's, Hicks', and Nash's Theories, Econometrica 24, 144-157.
1934: Fisher, R. A. (1934), Randomisation, and an Old Enigma of Card Play, Mathematical Gazette 18, 294-297.
1938: Ville, Jean (1938), Note sur la theorie generale des jeux ou intervient l'habilite des jouers, pp. 105-113 in Applications aux jeux de hasard, Tome IV, Fascicule II of Traite du calcul des probabilities et de ses applications (Emile Borel), Paris: Gauthier-Villars.
1944: von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern (1944), Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1945: Simon, H. A. (1945), Review of the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern, American Journal of Sociology 27, 558-560.
1946: Loomis, L. H. (1946), On a Theorem of von Neumann, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 32, 213-215.
1950: Kuhn, H. W. and A. W. Tucker, eds. (1950), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume I (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 24). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1950: Publication of Tucker's (1950) memo occurred in 1980 under the title On Jargon: The Prisoner's Dilemma, UMAP Journal 1, 101.
1950: McDonald, John (1950), Strategy in Poker, Business and War. New York: Norton. This book based on two articles McDonald wrote for Fortune magazine. The first, Poker, An American Game (March, 1948) and the second, A Theory of Strategy (June, 1949).
1950-1953: Nash, J. F. (1950), Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36, 48-49.; Nash, J. F. (1951), Non-Cooperative Games, Annals of Mathematics 54, 286-295.; Nash, J. F. (1950), The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18, 155-162.; Nash, J. F. (1953), Two Person Cooperative Games, Econometrica 21, 128-140.
1950-1953: Kuhn, H. W. (1950), Extensive Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 36, 570–576.; Kuhn, H. W. (1953), Extensive Games and the Problem of Information, pp. 193-216 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28) (H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1951: Brown, G. W. (1951), Iterative Solution of Games by Fictitious Play, pp. 374-376 in Activity Analysis of Production and Allocation (T. C. Koopmans, ed.), New York: Wiley.
1952: McKinsey, John Charles C. (1952), Introduction to the Theory of Games. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.
1952: Flood's 1952 Rand memorandum was published in Flood, M. A. (1958), Some Experimental Games, Management Science 5, 5-26.
1952: Some of the experimental papers from the conference appear in Thrall, R. M., C. H. Coombs and R. C. Davis, eds. (1954), Decision Processes. New York: Wiley.
1952-53: Gillies published version of the core concept appears in his paper, Gillies, D. B. (1959), Solutions to General Non-Zero-Sum Games, pp. 47-85 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1953: Shapley, L. S. (1953), A Value for n-Person Games, pp. 307-317 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28) (H. W. Kuhn and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1953: Shapley, L. S. (1953), Stochastic Games, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 39, 1095-1100.
1953: Kuhn, H. W. and A. W. Tucker, eds. (1953), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume II (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 28). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1954: Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1954), A Method for Evaluating The Distribution of Power in a Committee System, American Political Science Review 48, 787-792.
1955: Braithwaite, R. B. (1955), Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1957: Luce, R. Duncan and Howard Raiffa (1957), Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York: Wiley. (Reprinted New York: Dover, 1989).
1957: Dresher, Melvin, A. W. Tucker and P. Wolfe, eds. (1957), Contributions to theTheory of Games, Volume III (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 39). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959: Aumann, R. J. (1959), Acceptable Points in General Cooperative N-Person Games, pp. 287-324 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959: Shubik, M. (1959), Edgeworth Market Games, pp. 267-278 in Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40) (A. W. Tucker and R. D. Luce, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959: Tucker, A. W. and R. D. Luce, eds. (1959), Contributions to the Theory of Games, Volume IV (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 40). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1959: Shubik, M. (1959), Strategy and Market Structure: Competition, Oligopoly, and the Theory of Games. New York: Wiley.
1960: Aumann, R. J. and B. Peleg (1960), Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 66, 173-179.
1960: Schelling, T. C. (1960), The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1961: Lewontin, R. C. (1961), Evolution and the Theory of Games, Journal of Theoretical Biology 1, 382-403.
1961: Aumann, R. J. (1961), The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society 98, 539-552.
1962: Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962), College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, American Mathematics Monthly 69, 9-15.
1962: Shubik, M. (1962), Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing, Management Science 8, 325-343.
1962: Borch, Karl (1962), Application of Game Theory to Some Problems in Automobile Insurance, The Astin Bulletin 2 (part 2), 208-221.
1963: Debreu, G. and H. Scarf (1963), A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy, International Economic Review 4, 235-246.
1964: Aumann, R. J. (1964), Markets with a Continuum of Traders, Econometrica 32, 39-50.
1964: Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler (1964), The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games, pp. 443-476 in Advances in Game Theory (Annals of Mathematics Studies, 52) (M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley and A. W. Tucker, eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1964: Lemke, Carlton E. and J. T. Howson, Jr. (1964), Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Journal of Applied Mathematics 12, 413-423.
1965: Isaacs, Rufus (1965), Differential Games: A Mathematical Theory with Applications to Warfare and Pursuit, Control and Optimization. New York: Wiley.
1965: Selten, R. (1965), Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetragheit, Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121, 301-324 and 667-689.
1965: Davis, M. and M. Maschler (1965), The Kernel of a Cooperative Game, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 223-259.
1966: Aumann, R. J. and M. Maschler (1966), Game-Theoretic Aspects of Gradual Disarmament, Chapter V in Report to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ST-80. Princeton: Mathematica.
1966: Harsanyi, J. C. (1966), A General Theory of Rational Behavior in Game Situations, Econometrica 34, 613-634.
1967: Shapley, L. S. (1967), On Balanced Sets and Cores, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 14, 453-460.
1967: Scarf, H. E. (1967), The Core of a N-Person Game, Econometrica 35, 50-69.
1967-68: Harsanyi, J. C. (1967-8), Games with Incomplete Information Played by 'Bayesian' Players, Parts I, II and III, Management Science 14, 159-182, 320-334 and 486-502.
1968: Lucas, W. F. (1968), A Game with No Solution, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 74, 237-239.
1969: Schmeidler, D. (1969), The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game, Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics Journal of Applied Mathematics 17, 1163-1170.
1969: Shapley, L. S. (1969), Utility Comparison and the Theory of Games, pp. 251-263 in La Decision, Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique. (Reprinted on pp. 307-319 of The Shapley Value (Alvin E. Roth, ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
1969: Shapley, L. S. and M. Shubik (1969), On Market Games, Journal of Economic Theory 1, 9-25.
1972: Maynard Smith, John (1972), Game Theory and the Evolution of Fighting, pp.8-28 in On Evolution (John Maynard Smith), Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
1973: Harsanyi, J. C. (1973), Games with Randomly Distured Payoffs: A New Rationale for Mixed Strategy Equilibrium Points, International Journal of Game Theory 2, 1-23.
1973: Maynard Smith, John and G. A. Price (1973), The Logic of Animal Conflict, Nature 246, 15-18.
1973: Gibbard, A. (1973), Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result, Econometrica 41, 587-601.
1974: Aumann, R. J. and L. S. Shapley (1974), Values of Non-Atomic Games. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1974: Aumann, R. J. (1974), Subjectivity and Correlation in Randomized Strategies, Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 67-96.
1975: Selten, R. (1975), Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games, International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25-55.
1975: Kalai, E. and M. Smorodinsky (1975), Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 43, 513-518.
1975: Faulhaber, G. (1975), Cross-Subsidization: Pricing in Public Enterprises, American Economic Review 65, 966-977.
1976: Lewis, D. K. (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1976: Aumann, R. J. (1976), Agreeing to Disagree, Annals of Statistics 4, 1236-1239.
1977: Littlechild, S. C. and G. F. Thompson (1977), Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach, Bell Journal of Economics 8, 186-204.
1981: Kohlberg, Elon (1981), Some Problems with the Concept of Perfect Equilibria, Rapporteurs' Report of the NBER Conference on the Theory of General Economic Equilibrium by Karl Dunz and Nirvikar Sing, University of Californa Berkeley.
1981: Aumann, R. J. (1981), Survey of Repeated Games, pp.11-42 in Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern (R. J. Aumann et al), Zurich: Bibliographisches Institut. (This paper is a slightly revised and updated version of a paper originally presented as background material for a one-day workshop on repeated games that took place at the Institute for Mathematical Studies in the Social Sciences (Stanford University) summer seminar on mathematical economics on 10 August 1978.) (A slightly revised and updated version of the 1981 version is reprinted as Repeated Games on pp. 209-242 of Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare (George R Feiwel, ed.), London: Macmillan.)
1982: Kreps, D. M. and R. B. Wison (1982), Sequential Equilibria, Econometrica 50, 863-894.
1982: Rubinstein, A. (1982), Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model, Econometrica 50, 97-109.
1982: Maynard Smith, John (1982), Evolution and the Theory of Games. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1984: Roth, A. E. (1984), The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, Journal of Political Economy 92, 991-1016.
1984: Bernheim, B. D. (1984), Rationalizable Strategic Behavior, Econometrica 52, 1007-1028.
1984: Pearce, D. G. (1984), Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection, Econometrica 52, 1029-1050.
1984: Axelrod, R. (1984), The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
1985: Mertens, J.-F. and S. Zamir (1985), Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incomplete Information, International Journal of Games Theory 14, 1-29.
1985-86: Neyman, A. (1985), Bounded Complexity Jusifies Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Economic Letters 19, 227-229.
1985-86: Rubinstein, A. (1986), Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, Journal of Economic Theory 39, 83-96.
1986: Kohlberg, E. and J.-F. Mertens (1986), On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria, Econometrica 54, 1003-1037.
1988: Harsanyi, J. C. and R. Selten (1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games. Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press.
1988: Tan, T. and S. Werlang (1988), The Bayesian Foundations of Solution Concepts of Games, Journal of Economic Theory 45, 370-391.
1990: Kreps, D. M. (1990), A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
1990: Crawford, V. P. (1990), Equilibrium without Independence, Journal of Economic Theory 50,127-154.
1991: Fudenberg, D. and J. Tirole (1991), Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory 53, 236-260.
1992: Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, eds. (1992), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 1. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
1994: Baird, Douglas G., Robert H. Gertner and Randal C. Picker (1994), Game Theory and the Law. Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press.
1994: Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, eds. (1994), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 2. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
2002: Aumann, R. J. and S. Hart, eds. (2002), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, Volume 3. Amsterdam: North-Holland.